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PRIVATE ORDERING AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICE: DEFINING THE ROLE OF 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN 
PROMOTING GLOBAL LABOR STANDARDS 
ANNETTE BURKEEN∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Increased economic globalization has resulted in many U.S. 
multinational corporations either establishing manufacturing operations in 
less economically developed countries or purchasing products from 
suppliers who have done so.1 U.S. companies are leveraging lower labor 
and regulatory costs in developing countries to maintain a competitive 
edge in the world market.2 Multinational corporations purchase consumer 
 
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky 
University. B.A., University of Southern California; J.D., Howard University. I am grateful for the 
support and helpful comments of my colleagues at Salmon P. Chase College of Law.  
 1. Wal-Mart, for example, does not own, operate, or manage any factories. It conducts all of its 
business, including production of its private label products, through suppliers. WAL-MART, 2005 
REPORT ON ETHICAL SOURCING 5 (2006), available at http://walmartstores.com/Files/os_ethical_ 
source.pdf [hereinafter WAL-MART, ETHICAL SOURCING]. See also Roman Terrill, What Does 
“Globalization” Mean?, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 218 (1999). 
Globalization is also tied to accelerated economic integration through private cross-border 
financial flows. Whether it’s BMW and Mercedes Benz constructing factories in the southern 
United States, or U.S. pension fund managers investing billions of dollars in Mexican or Thai 
stocks, the economies of individual nations are becoming increasingly integrated because of 
private, cross-border financial flows. 
Terrill, supra. 
 2. Globalization of labor markets has been characterized by both the move of capital from 
developed nations to less developed nations as well as the move of immigrant workers from less 
developed countries to developed countries. For a more detailed discussion of this cross movement, 
see Frances Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law in Globalization of Labor Markets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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products—such as clothing, shoes, sporting goods, and children’s toys—
from suppliers in developing countries and sell those products to 
consumers worldwide. Some of these corporations, such as the Walt 
Disney Company and Nike, have come under fire in the media for 
reportedly purchasing goods from suppliers who operate sweatshops or 
utilize child labor in less developed countries.3  
Sweatshop businesses operate under grossly substandard working 
conditions, where fifteen-hour work days, low wages, unsanitary work 
environments, coerced labor, rape, and even death are regular 
occurrences.4 Some reports have linked human trafficking5 and child 
labor6 with some sweatshops in countries like Myanmar, China, Jordan, 
and Oman. The mere mention of the word “sweatshop” conjures images of 
people, including children, engaged in back-breaking labor under 
degrading, hazardous conditions for little or no pay. The proliferation of 
sweatshops jeopardizes the human rights and dignity of millions of 
workers and fosters a harmful anti-globalization sentiment among workers 
in both industrialized and developing countries.  
 
 
L. 369, 370–404 (1998). Whether the employment laws of developed nations, such as the United 
States, provide sufficient protection to immigrant workers is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 3. See, e.g., Marc Gunther, How Companies Fight Sweatshops, CNNMONEY.COM, May 3, 2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/03/news/international/pluggedin_fortune/ (describing the Walt Disney 
Company’s efforts to identify suppliers operating sweatshops). 
 4. See generally NO SWEAT: FASHION, FREE TRADE, AND THE RIGHTS OF GARMENT WORKERS 
(Andrew Ross ed., 1997). 
 5. Charles Kernaghan, Director of the National Labor Committee, recently testified in 
Congressional hearings that many of the estimated 300,000 guest workers in Jordan are victims of 
human trafficking, and many are being forced to work in Jordanian factories that supply goods to the 
U.S. companies. Modern Day Slavery: Spotlight on the 2006 “Trafficking in Persons Report,” Forced 
Labor, and Sex Trafficking at the World Cup, Briefing and Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa, 
Global Human Rights and International Operations of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 109th 
Cong. 52 (2006) (statement of Charles Kernaghan, Director, National Labor Committee), available at 
http://internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/28104.PDF. See also Antonio Juhasz, Trading on 
Terror to Profit a Few, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2006, at B11. “American companies seeking cheap, easy 
labor are not likely to meet much opposition from the Omani government. The State Department has 
reported Oman for human-trafficking and forced labor.” Juhasz, supra. 
 6. The problem of child labor is particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa, which has the greatest 
proportion of child labor in the world. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, THE END OF CHILD LABOUR: WITHIN 
REACH, GLOBAL REPORT UNDER THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK 64 (2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/ 
standards/relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-i-b.pdf. By the latest United Nations’ estimates, more than 49 million 
children below age 14 work in sub-Saharan Africa. Id. at 8. The U.N. report identifies the “region’s 
economic plight, . . . social mores, violent conflicts, staggering HIV rates, and population explosion” 
as major factors. Michael Wines, African Adds to Miserable Ranks of Child Workers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 24, 2006, at A1. In Zamibia alone, AIDS had boosted child labor by up to 30 percent. Wines, 
supra.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/2
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Large corporations have reaped tremendous economic benefits from 
globalization, often at the expense of workers in impoverished nations. 
Some economists suggest that sweatshops are the “price” of global 
economic development.7 However, consumers, advocacy groups, and 
governmental agencies are pressuring U.S. multinational corporations to 
leverage their economic relationships with suppliers to improve conditions 
for workers in developing countries.8  
A. Abstract 
Ian R. McNeil’s concept of relational contracting helped to transform 
our understanding of a contract from a mere exchange of promises to the 
creation of a relationship.9 Contracts are “relations among people who 
have exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to be exchanging in the 
future—in other words, exchange relations.”10  
Private ordering builds upon relational contracting theory. A private 
order is a system of specialized rules and procedures developed and 
voluntarily adhered to by private actors.11 In other words, private ordering 
is private lawmaking. As a community engages in repeated exchange 
relations, norms—i.e., community expectations on how to behave—
develop. These norms are essentially private rules created by private 
actors. To the extent that a private actor values the exchange relations, the 
desire to continue the relations serves as an incentive to comply with the 
community’s norms, even those norms with which the private actor would 
not otherwise comply. Thus, contracts become self-enforcing by inducing 
voluntary compliance. “Social and economic sanctions imposed on the 
party in breach, whether by the aggrieved party or by the economic and 
social community in which both parties operate, replace legal sanctions.”12 
 
 
 7. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristoff & Sheryl WuDunn, Two Cheers for Sweatshops, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, Sept. 24, 2000, at 70. 
 8. See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global 
Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2002) (arguing that U.S. firms conducting business through 
foreign suppliers that utilize forced labor violate the Thirteenth Amendment); compare Julia Fisher, 
Note, Free Speech to Have Sweatshops? How Kasky v. Nike Might Provide a Useful Tool to Improve 
Sweatshop Conditions, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 267 (2006) (arguing that corporate denials of the 
use of sweatshop suppliers may constitute false advertising and are unprotected by the First 
Amendment free speech and corporate speech doctrines). 
 9. Ian R. McNeil, Relational Contracting Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
877, 878 (2000) (describing his development of relational contract theory). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory 
of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2338–39 (2004). 
 12. Ariel Porat, Enforcing Contracts in Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A key component to the efficacy of private ordering is that the cost of 
non-compliance must exceed the cost of compliance. The desire to 
conduct business with U.S. companies provides an incentive for suppliers 
that operate sweatshops to comply with global labor norms. However, 
private ordering among multinational corporations and suppliers will have 
limited impact on sectors of developing countries’ economies unaffected 
by international trade, such as service industries.  
Any examination of the role of private ordering is really an inquiry into 
institutional choice: choosing between public institutions or privately-
developed processes. Recent literature on private ordering analyzes the 
extent to which privately-developed rules are more efficient than publicly-
promulgated laws.13 Stated differently, commentators ask under what 
circumstances should public law defer to privately-created rules. This 
inquiry is germane to the issue of labor conditions in factories in 
developing countries. Two questions are central to the problem of 
eradicating sweatshops: (1) what role should multinational corporations 
play in developing and enforcing global labor standards; and (2) to what 
extent should governments defer to privately-developed labor standards? 
The question of public versus private ordering has been characterized as 
“ultimately a problem of second-best.”14 Because neither private nor 
public ordering tends toward complete efficiency, a system must draw 
upon both private ordering and public ordering to address effectively 
global working conditions. The challenge of eliminating sweatshops in a 
global labor market offers a rich context in which to study the inter-
dependency of private and public ordering. 
An important component to this discussion on private ordering is 
identifying what global labor norms currently exist. The International 
Labour Organization’s15 (ILO) 1998 Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work (the “1998 Declaration”) is an influential 
 
 
Between Public and Private Orders, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2459 (2000). 
 13. Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1745 (1995–
1996). 
 14. Katz, supra note 13, at 1747. In 1995, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review published 
a symposium issue on Law, Economics, and Norms, which featured articles by Avery Katz, Robert D. 
Cooter, and Eric Posner. In commenting on the works of Cooter and Posner, Katz observed that “the 
comparison between public and private lawmaking depends on questions of incentives, information, 
and externalities, that neither public nor private institutions are fully efficient in all circumstances, and 
that choosing between the two kinds of institutions is thus ultimately a problem of the second-best.” 
Id. 
 15. The International Labour Organization, a specialized United Nations agency, formulates 
international labor standards. The agency seeks to promote social justice and internationally 
recognized human and labor rights. The ILO fulfills its mission by adopting conventions and 
recommendations that its members may ratify. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/2
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source of global labor norms. The 1998 Declaration articulated four 
“fundamental” principles that all countries, regardless of their level of 
development, should respect and promote: (1) “freedom from forced 
labor,” (2) “nondiscrimination in the workplace,” (3) “the effective 
abolition of child labor,” and (4) “freedom of association and the right to 
organize and bargain collectively.”16 The ILO’s promulgation of these 
four principles, also described as “core labor standards,” does not end the 
debate on global labor standards; rather, it merely focuses it. While the 
ILO standards address some of the most exploitive labor practices, the 
standards do not address other critical labor issues, such as the need for 
minimum or living wages, maximum work hours, overtime pay, holiday 
leave, maternity leave, and occupational safety. Furthermore, the ILO’s 
core labor standards do not address enforcement issues. 
Competing concerns of protectionism, consumerism, human rights, and 
global wealth maximization have polarized the discussion on global labor 
norms. Henry H. Drummonds offers a colorful description of the 
extremities within the debate: 
Too often discussions of economic globalization take on a “good 
girl-bad boy” perspective. From the Left, globalization often means 
the loss of blue collar production and other jobs in the rustbelts of 
the American Midwest, East, and elsewhere and the exploitation of 
children, women, and other workers in places such as Mexico, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and China. From the Right, concerns about the 
impact on workers at home and abroad are seen as reflecting merely 
parochial interests. From this perspective, at best, opposition to 
“free trade” reflects ignorance of the wealth maximizing magic of 
free markets, and Ricardian trade advantage, and the dynamics of 
economic development in developing nations. At worst, from this 
perspective, opposition to expanded trade reveals at bottom an 
indifference to the materially wretched plight of billions of humans 
on this earth and the inherently unstable monopolization of the 
world’s resources by the peoples of the developed world.17 
The perceived loss of U.S. jobs and the shame of benefiting from 
human exploitation have contributed to a growing American ambivalence, 
 
 
 16. KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE 
UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 8–9 (2003). 
 17. Henry H. Drummonds, Transnational Small and Emerging Business in a World of Nikes and 
Microsofts (A Retrospective Article on the 1998 Lewis & Clark Law Forum and the Message of 
Seattle), 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 249, 252–53 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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even antipathy, toward free trade. Proponents of global labor standards 
also argue that, absent governmental intervention, globalization 
disproportionately benefits wealthy nations and income disparities 
between nations are magnified.18 Workers in non-industrialized countries 
remain vulnerable to labor and human rights abuses. Proponents of global 
labor standards tend to favor an international public order in which 
sovereign governments create and enforce the global labor standards 
through trade sanctions.  
Conversely, free trade advocates contend that global economic growth 
will improve working conditions, thus alleviating the need for additional 
governmental intervention.19 Such a view suggests that multinational 
corporations, through their repeated interactions with suppliers, are best 
suited for developing and enforcing norms impacting wages, hours, and 
safety conditions. 
Evidence suggests that unrestricted private ordering among 
multinational corporations creates a “race to the bottom.”20 Globalization, 
from a critical perspective, has resulted in the restructuring of labor 
markets to enable U.S. and other multinational corporations to drive down 
costs by increasing competition among developing nations to provide 
cheaper labor and lower-cost regulatory schemes.21 Developing countries 
able to provide the cheapest labor will attract greater foreign investment.22 
The competition of developing countries for a portion of the economic 
benefits of globalization creates downward pressure on the wages of 
unskilled workers worldwide.23 Market forces alone do not create 
 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. See ELLIOTT & FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 9. 
 20. Surya Deva, Sustainable Good Governance & Corporations: An Analysis of Asymmetries, 18 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 707, 714 n.27 (2006) (citing Dinah Shelton, Challenges to the Future of 
Civil and Political Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 669, 684 (1998); Surya Deva, The Sangam of 
Foreign Investment, Multinational Corporations and Human Rights: An Indian Perspective for 
Developing Asia, SING. J.L. STUD. 305, 313–14 & generally (2004)). 
 21. See, e.g., Lori G. Kletzer, Trade and Job Loss in U.S. Manufacturing, 1979–1994, in THE 
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE ON WAGES 349–96 (Robert C. Feenstra ed., 2000) “Labor 
reallocation is a likely implication of a move to freer trade, and there is sizable empirical literature that 
examines the link between increasing trade and changes in industry net employment and wages.” Id. 
 22. Dinah Shelton discusses this phenomenon in depth. 
Economic globalization may undermine national and international human rights protections 
as states make an effort to remain competitive and to entice investment. The “race to the 
bottom” is a threat, as countries are pressured to relax their standards for the treatment of 
workers, denying collective bargaining, minimum wages, and, in some cases, the right to be 
free from forced labor. 
Shelton, supra note 20, at 684. 
 23. See, e.g., CARL DAVIDSON & STEVEN J. MATUSZ, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND LABOR 
MARKETS: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 22 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/2
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sufficient incentives for multinational corporations to internalize higher 
labor and regulatory costs. Requiring multinational corporations to use 
their contracting power to improve labor conditions in developing 
countries is essentially asking such companies to forego one of the 
primary economic benefits of globalization.24 
The critical question becomes when multinational corporations would 
ever relinquish this benefit. The answer? Only when pressured to do so.  
Norms, whether private or codified, can impose such pressure. Cass 
Sunstein defines norms simply as “social attitudes of approval and 
disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be 
done.”25 He observed that “[g]ood social norms solve collective action 
problems, by encouraging people to do useful things that they would not 
do without the relevant norms . . .”; further, when norms are inadequate or 
start to disintegrate, society can encounter difficulties and even collapse.26  
The widespread existence of sweatshops suggests that weak labor 
norms exist in the global labor market. The ILO’s 1998 Declaration 
reflects a consensus among nations on some foundational principles, but it 
does not resolve collective action problems beyond the core labor 
standards. The inadequacy of labor norms has contributed to widening 
wealth disparities between nations and to potential instability in 
developing countries. Stronger labor norms may encourage multinational 
corporations and suppliers to improve the working conditions of factory 
workers worldwide.  
 
 
 24. Donald L. Kohn, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, noted:  
The opening up of China and India, in particular, represents a potentially huge increase in the 
global supply of mainly lower-skilled workers. And it is clear that the low cost of production 
in these and other emerging economies has led to a geographic shift in production toward 
them; from a U.S perspective, the ratio of imported goods to domestically produced goods 
has risen noticeably in recent years. 
Donald L. Kohn, Vice-Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the European Economics and 
Financial Centre Seminar, House of Commons, London, England (July 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.federal reserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2006/20060706/default.htm. 
 25. Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996); see also 
Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996) (“A 
norm can be understood as a rule that distinguishes desirable and undesirable behavior and gives a 
third party the authority to punish a person who engages in the undesirable behavior. Thus, a norm 
constrains attempts by people to satisfy their preferences.”). In discussing norms generally, Cass 
Sunstein observed: 
There are norms about littering, dating, smoking, singing, when to stand, when to sit, when to 
show anger, when, how and with whom to express affection, when to talk, when to listen, 
when to discuss personal matters, when to use contractions . . . [i]n fact, there are social 
norms about every aspect of human behavior. 
Sunstein, supra, at 914. 
 26. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 914. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The debate about global labor standards centers on who should define 
the norms and who should enforce them. In resolving these questions, we 
should heed Sunstein’s caution that some people may reject norms 
because the source of the norm lacks legitimacy.27 Since multinational 
corporations derive their legitimacy from obtaining economically-efficient 
results, labor norms created by efficiency-driven corporations are viewed 
suspiciously.  
B. Goals of this Article 
This Article examines how private ordering among multinational 
corporations and suppliers can eliminate sweatshop conditions in less 
developed countries. Accordingly, this Article focuses on labor conditions 
in industries impacted by international trade—i.e., those industries 
influenced by the contractual decisions of multinational corporations. 
Many commentators approach private ordering as an either/or 
proposition—that is, either private ordering or public ordering is preferred. 
This Article seeks to deemphasize this dichotomy because it masks the 
opportunity to examine the interdependence of private and public orders in 
the context of globalization’s impact on labor standards.28 
Part II of this Article explains why multinational corporations lack 
legitimacy in creating global labor norms. While theories of relational 
contracting and private ordering shed light on the question of how to 
improve working conditions in developing countries, unrestricted private 
ordering among multinational corporations will not yield efficient labor 
norms. U.S. businesses have not created labor norms that address the 
international community’s distributive goals, and U.S. businesses are not 
likely to do so spontaneously. The norms created spontaneously by 
multinational corporations through unrestricted contracting are detrimental 
to workers worldwide and to global wealth maximization. Further, 
economic disparities among nations and a lack of coordination impose 
hurdles to the legitimacy and capability of multinational corporations as 
the sole creator of norms. Therefore, public law is necessary to identify 
fundamental labor rights of laborers. For example, the ILO’s Decent Work 
Initiative is a promising source for global norms. 
 
 
 27. Id. at 918–19. 
 28. Porat, supra note 12, at 2460. “In the real world, one cannot draw a distinct line between 
countries where a public order operates and countries where a private one obtains—both orders tend to 
function in every country, in varying degrees. . . . [N]o public order is ever perfect to the point of 
making private order redundant.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/2
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Part III acknowledges that public law serves the important expressive 
function of validating the need to protect human rights in the context of 
free trade and globalization. However, a purely public order has limited 
capability to enforce norms because of the inefficiencies in public 
institutions in a global marketplace. Public ordering may correct wholesale 
failures to respect fundamental labor rights by the governments of 
developing countries, but it is inadequate to address direct violations by 
private suppliers. 
Part III also argues that multinational corporations should play a 
significant role in the enforcement of global labor norms. Advocates of 
global labor standards have suggested various enforcement mechanisms 
that may be characterized roughly as either private ordering, such as 
product labeling, preferred supplier programs, and corporate codes of 
conduct, or public ordering, such as including labor provisions in trade 
agreements. 
Part IV concludes that the strengths and deficiencies in private and 
public ordering in the context of globalization and labor standards 
complement each other. Thus, an effective model for achieving and 
enforcing global labor standards must incorporate both public and private 
ordering. 
II. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS SOURCES OF NORMS:  
QUESTIONS OF LEGITIMACY 
The emergence of global labor norms has resulted largely from the 
efforts of the ILO, but only after unrestricted private ordering has failed to 
improve working conditions in developing countries.  
Part II.A provides a brief description of private ordering theory. The 
question of private versus public ordering should be examined in the 
context of the desired goal: promulgating global labor norms. Because no 
evidence exists supporting the belief that private ordering will result in 
complete efficiency, permitting private ordering should not be the goal in 
and of itself. It is merely a potential means to achieving an objective.  
Part II.B examines the impact of unrestricted private ordering on 
working conditions worldwide. Contrary to classical economics, market 
conditions and economic growth have not led to an optimal distribution of 
resources.  
Part II.C discusses the ILO’s core labor standards. The limited impact 
of the core standards on the existence of sweatshops is due, in part, to the 
narrow scope of the standards. Part II.D explains why private ordering 
among multinational corporations cannot produce good norms for non-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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core labor issues. Finally, Part II.E examines the ILO’s response to the 
failure of private ordering to increase wages, provide safe and sanitary 
work environments, and provide reasonable work hours for millions of 
laborers. 
A. Private Ordering and Institutional Choice 
Private ordering is susceptible to multiple interpretations; thus, a brief 
description of the relationship of “private ordering” to “public ordering” is 
prudent. “Private ordering” defies precise definition, in part, because 
various levels of governmental participation may occur. Much of the 
literature on private ordering focuses primarily on two questions. First, are 
the rules established by private groups likely to be efficient, either on an 
absolute scale or compared to regulations promulgated by the State? 
Second, to what extent should the State defer to existing private rules?29 
According to Steven Schwarcz, “[p]rivate ordering can be viewed as 
part of a broad spectrum within which rulemaking is classified by the 
amount of governmental participation involved.”30 Models of private 
ordering range from systems in which private actors create and enforce 
rules without governmental sanctions (i.e., unrestricted private ordering) to 
systems in which private actors create rules that are enforced by the 
State.31  
Common to each model is the role of the private actor as primary 
rulemaker. Therefore, “private ordering” is a system of rules and 
procedures that private actors develop.32 In this sense, private ordering is 
conceptualized as an extra-legal process, an alternative means of 
producing socially desirable behavior outside the traditional legal order.  
Private ordering frequently occurs through relational contracting, 
which recognizes that the possibility of repeat business may create self-
enforcing mechanisms.33 Contracting becomes a vehicle for creating and 
 
 
 29. See Katz, supra note 13, at 1746. 
 30. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 324 (2002). Schwarcz 
identifies four models of ordering: (1) rules created and enforced by ruling governments, (2) rules 
created by private actors but enforced by governments, (3) rules created and enforced by private actors 
via governmental delegation, and (4) rules designed and adopted by private actors without 
governmental participation. Id. The first model constitutes public ordering. The last category 
constitutes private ordering. The remaining categories are a combination of private and public 
ordering. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Richman, supra note 11, at 2338–39.  
 33. See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public 
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2424 (2000) (“Players may refrain from squeezing the last cent out of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/2
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imposing restrictions. Repeated interactions promote cooperation. Parties 
are more willing to conform to the norm because of the “threat of 
retaliation and consequent loss of business.”34 Relational contracting 
enables the creation and enforcement of rules without governmental 
sanctions to the extent it provides sufficient economic incentives for 
compliance. 
Private ordering arises, either spontaneously or through organized 
contracting, when the legal system does not provide a satisfactory means 
of resolving disputes. Private ordering may arise from family customs, 
religious doctrine, or business practices.35  
Christopher Woodruff and John McMillan studied when relational 
contracting, communal norms, trade associations, or market intermediaries 
replace the traditional legal order.36 They observed: “If the legal system 
functioned perfectly, contracts would never need to be self-enforcing. A 
frictionless legal system would always work at least as well as relational 
contracting.”37 They conclude that private ordering either substitutes for 
the public order or supplements it, and that private ordering is more likely 
to “substitute” for public ordering when public institutions are 
dysfunctional, that is, when a country lacks a functioning judicial system, 
trained judges and lawyers, or when corruption is rampant.38  
Private ordering also occurs in sophisticated legal systems when “the 
transaction costs of appealing to the legal system exceed the transaction 
costs of using relational contracting.”39 Relational contracting may offer 
lower transaction costs in three distinct ways. 
First, private actors have greater ability to monitor the conduct of other 
participants.40 A governmental agency’s mechanism for information 
gathering is centralized. Private actors provide decentralized information 
gathering within their industry and, through their dealings, have greater 
opportunities to observe the practices of other private actors.  
Second, private actors can make more nuanced decisions than judicial 
systems.41 Courts are usually limited to “binary decision[s] . . . of liability 
 
 
the current deal because they wish to do business in the future, either with this particular trading 
partner or with others who could learn of [the players’] behavior.”). 
 34. Id.  
 35. Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and 
Illegitimate Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1124 (1997). 
 36. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 33, at 2421. 
 37. Id. at 2425. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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or no liability.”42 However, private actors may opt for solutions other than 
monetary damages or may require other actors to engage in a rehabilitative 
program designed to bring the participant into compliance with the norm.  
Third, private actors can consider information that cannot be 
introduced in court such as impressions about business trends, judgments 
of quality of goods sold, and predictions of firm behavior over time based 
on probabilistic patterns.43  
Even in a well-developed legal system, private actors may rely on 
relational contracting to reduce investigation and enforcement 
transactional costs.44 Relational contracting allows private actors to avoid 
nonrecoverable attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and the uncertainty of jury 
verdicts. Resolution of disputes occurs within a commercially practical 
time while the judicial process, including appeals, may take years. 
As Avery Katz notes, the debate about private versus public ordering is 
essentially “a variation on the basic framework of transaction-cost 
economics.”45 The theory of private ordering traces its roots to “Adam 
Smith’s famous argument that the market would lead, as an invisible hand, 
to the optimal allocation of all resources to their highest and best use.”46 
At the heart of private ordering is the assumption that the market will 
influence the development of optimal labor norms and enforcement 
mechanisms.  
Opponents of private ordering raise concerns similar to those proffered 
by critics of Adam Smith’s laissez-faire approach.47 The preferability of 
private ordering depends on market assumptions that do not hold in 
practice.48 As a result, market forces do not result in optimal resource 
allocation.  
Ronald Coase expanded the discussion by demonstrating that state 
allocation of resources also falls short of optimal efficiency.49 Since 
neither private nor public ordering will obtain complete efficiency, neither 
institution is inherently preferable over the other.  
The question of private versus public ordering is really one of 
institutional choice, i.e., in which institutional setting are transaction costs 
 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Katz, supra note 13, at 1752. 
 45. Id. at 1753. 
 46. Id. (citing ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 577 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (1776)). 
 47. Id. (citing A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932)). 
 48. Id. at 1753–54 (discussing Pigou’s theory of market failure). 
 49. Id. at 1754–55. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/2
p 205 Burkeen book pages.doc10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] PRIVATE ORDERING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 217 
 
 
 
 
less? The relevant institution may be an unrestricted private order, a purely 
public order, or a system with private order and public order components.  
This “private order” versus “public order” debate is limited in two 
senses. First, the debate is merely of a jurisdictional character.50 It focuses 
upon which institution—the court, the legislature, or the community—is 
best able to establish a norm; however, it does not answer the question of 
what the norm should be.51 This jurisdictional debate places the cart before 
the horse. It implicitly assumes that once the jurisdictional question is 
answered, the best rule will naturally follow.52 Second, the inquiry 
presents a stark dichotomy that oversimplifies the dynamic relationship 
between public law and private norms.  
In his groundbreaking work on private ordering, Robert C. Ellickson 
conceded that under some circumstances, public-created rules will be 
preferable to privately-created norms. First, spontaneously-created norms 
may not promote corrective or distributive goals.53 Second, certain norms 
that maximize the welfare of persons within a group may have a 
detrimental effect on those outside the group.54 Lastly, publicly-created 
laws may be necessary to establish the set of fundamental rights within a 
society.55 Therefore, dysfunctionality may affect both private and public 
orders, making it necessary for private and public orders to supplement 
each other. 
B. Globalization and Labor Reallocation: The Failure of Unrestricted 
Private Ordering among Multinational Corporations  
Broadly stated, globalization is the “historical process which 
transforms the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, 
generating transcontinental or interregional networks of activity, 
interaction, and the exercise of power.”56 From this perspective, 
 
 
 50. Katz, supra note 13, at 1747–48. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 283–84 
(1991). See also Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1720–
22 (1996) (explaining that human emotions, such as jealousy, envy, and spite, may render privately-
created norms inefficient). 
 54. ELLICKSON, supra note 53, at 283–84. See also McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 33, at 
2423 (“It sometimes harms efficiency by excluding new entrants from trading or by achieving price 
collusion. Private ordering also can cause or perpetuate racial or gender discrimination.”). 
 55. ELLICKSON, supra note 53, at 284 (noting that private ordering “predicts nothing about the 
nature of a society’s foundational entitlements”). 
 56. David Held & Anthony McGraw, The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the 
Prospects for World Order, 24 REV. INT’L STUD. 219, 220 (1998). See also Alastair J. Walling, Early 
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globalization is a continual process of cultural, economic, social, and 
political integration that is fueled by increased interactions among people 
in previously distant regions.57  
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, describes 
globalization as a “process [that] has been going on for thousands of 
years.”58 Globalization is not a new phenomenon and, to some extent, it is 
a natural progression as populations increase and technologies advance.59  
Other scholars define globalization as “both a journey and a 
destination: it signifies a historical process of becoming, as well as an 
economic and cultural result; that is, arrival in a globalized state.”60 To 
this end, globalization necessarily entails a restructuring of all political and 
social systems.61  
Others equate globalization with international law—the regulations and 
conditions that influence international relations.62 These definitions 
describe globalization as a process, either self-compelled or guided. 
Implicit in each view is a recognition that globalization entails increased 
contact and interdependence.63 This Article focuses on one aspect of 
globalization, namely, the increased economic interdependence of the 
international community.64  
 
 
to Bed, Early to Rise, Work Like Hell and Globalize, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 161, 161 (2003–
2004) (adopting Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s distinction between globalism and globalization).  
 57. See Held & McGraw, supra note 56, at 220 (“Globalization is about connections between 
different regions of the world—from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the environmental—
and the ways in which they increase over time.”). 
 58. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City’s Thirtieth Annual Economic Symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 25, 2006). 
 59. See id. Chairman Bernanke concludes, based on a brief review of the history of global 
economic integration, that major factors impacting globalization include: (1) new technologies that 
reduce the costs of transportation and communication; (2) national policy choices embracing free trade 
and free capital flows; and (3) social dislocation and social resistance that may result when economies 
become more open. See id. 
 60. Marjorie Ferguson, The Mythology About Globalization, 7 EUR. J. COMM. 69, 70 (1992). 
 61. Id.  
 62. David Bederman, Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign Policy, 50 
EMORY L.J. 717, 718 (2001). Bederman argues: 
By “globalization,” I am referring to more than the phenomenon of global capital movements, 
market expansions, enforced free trade disciplines, and western cultural penetrations. Rather, 
I regard globalization as a set of conditions that are influencing international relations in not 
only the realms of economics and commerce, but also in transportation and communication, 
culture and ideas, and politics and security. In short, the permissible realm of international 
legal regulation is the ambit of globalization. 
Id. 
 63. See Surakiart Sathirathai, Renewing Our Global Value: A Multilateralism for Peace, 
Prosperity and Freedom, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 13 (2006) (noting the Cold War’s negative impact 
on global economic integration). 
 64. Globalization is characterized by “the declining significance of national borders, brought 
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The process of economic globalization has progressed more rapidly 
than the restructuring of the public institutions that regulate it. U.S. trade 
policies promote economic globalization by removing legal barriers to 
economic integration. Trade agreements remove or reduce tariffs and 
quotas so that capital and goods may flow more freely across national 
borders.65 U.S. free trade policy has spurned economic interdependence 
more quickly than it has addressed the impact of economic integration on 
labor practices in developing nations. Missing from many free trade 
agreements are labor provisions prohibiting exploitive labor practices.66 
Prior to the ILO’s 1998 Declaration, a strong consensus on labor 
standards was lacking. While the United Nations has addressed labor 
rights and child labor within the context of human rights,67 the lack of 
specificity in the U.N. proclamations has hindered their efficacy in 
eliminating sweatshops.68  
The ILO has focused on human and labor rights since its inception in 
1919. As of June 2006, the ILO has promulgated 187 conventions and 190 
 
 
about by increased trade, the spread of information technology, cross-border financial flows, and 
cultural transfers.” Roman Terrill, What Does “Globalization” Mean?, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 217, 217–18 (1999); see also Jackie Smith, Economic Globalization & Labor Rights: Towards 
Global Solidarity?, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 873, 873–74 (2006). In her remarks at 
the University of Notre Dame’s symposium on the Future of Labor Unions, Dr. Smith linked economic 
globalization with increased political instability and economic vulnerability in developing nations. 
Smith, supra. 
 65. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
289 (1993). See also Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uraguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 21, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
 66. See, e.g., Harry Reid, Letter to the Editor, Yes to More Free Trade, But No to Forced Labor, 
WALL ST. J., Jul. 15, 2006, at A9 (stating that President George W. Bush had removed from the U.S.-
Oman Free Trade Agreement a “no forced labor” clause that was unanimously approved by the Senate 
Finance Committee); but compare Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., art. 15, Sept. 15, 2004, 44 
I.L.M. 544 (2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/ 
final_texts/Section_Index.html (reaffirming United States’ and Bahrain’s commitment to ILO core 
labor standards). The World Trade Organization has resisted including a “labor” clause. See Gary 
Quinlivan & Antony Davies, Ethical Development and the Social Impact of Globalization, 20 INT’L J. 
WORLD PEACE 39 (2003) (noting the 1999 violent protests in Seattle against the WTO for favoring 
multinational corporations at the expense of laborers). 
 67. T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and Human Rights, in CONSTITUENT INTERESTS IN U.S. TRADE 
POLICIES 225, 228–29 (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 1998) (noting that article 55 of the 
U.N. Charter advocates nondiscrimination). The U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
includes “economic, social and cultural rights (right to join and form trade unions, right to work, right 
to equal pay for equal work, right to education) . . . [and] the right to decent living standards” within 
its definition of human rights. Id. at 229.  
 68. The United Nations had passed the Convention on the Rights of the Child; however, the lack 
of specificity in the Convention hindered its effectiveness in eliminating child labor. See Bernard 
Schlemmer, General Introduction, in THE EXPLOITED CHILD 1–2 (Bernard Schlemmer ed., 2000) The 
Convention “may well address the problem of child labour, but it gives no clear idea as to either who 
should be regarded as a child, working or otherwise, or what should be regarded as the work to which 
he or she must not be subjected.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
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recommendations pertaining to the rights of workers.69 These conventions 
propose norms relating to forced labor,70 child labor,71 maternity leave,72 
forty-hour work weeks,73 paid holidays,74 the right to associate,75 the right 
to bargain collectively,76 equal pay,77 social security,78 minimum wage,79 
minimum age,80 and occupational health and safety.81 Many ILO 
members, including the United States, have adopted few, if any, of these 
conventions.82 As of 1995, the United States has ratified only twelve 
 
 
 69. The conventions are international treaties, subject to ratification by the member states. The 
recommendations are non-binding instruments, often dealing with the same subject as the conventions, 
that set out guidelines orienting national policy and action. 
 70. ILO Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, Convention No. 29, adopted 
June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 56; ILO Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, 
Convention No. 105, adopted June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 292. 
 71. ILO Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour, Convention No. 182, adopted June 17, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1207. 
 72. ILO Convention Concerning the Revision of the Maternity Protection Convention, 
Convention No. 183, adopted June 15, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 2. 
 73. ILO Convention Concerning Reduction of Hours of Work to Forty a Week, Convention No. 
47, adopted June 22, 1935, 241 U.N.T.S. 304.  
 74. ILO Convention Concerning Annual Holidays with Pay, Convention No. 132, adopted June 
24, 1970, 883 U.N.T.S. 98. 
 75. ILO Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize, Convention No. 87, adopted July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 18. 
 76. ILO Convention Concerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining, Convention No. 154, 
adopted June 19, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 268. 
 77. ILO Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of 
Equal Value, Convention No. 100, adopted June 29, 1951, U.N.T.S. 303. 
 78. ILO Convention Concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security, Convention No. 102, 
adopted June 28, 1952, 210 U.N.T.S. 132. 
 79. ILO Convention Concerning Minimum Wage Fixing, with special reference to developing 
countries, Convention No. 131, adopted June 22, 1970, 825 U.N.T.S. 78. 
 80. ILO Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, Convention No. 
138, adopted June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 298. 
 81. ILO Convention Concerning the Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and 
Health, Convention No. 187, adopted June 15, 2006, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/ 
convdisp1.htm. 
 82. Although the United States was active in the ILO in its beginning, its participation in the ILO 
has wavered. See generally Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States’ Participation in the ILO: 
Redefining the Role, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 48 (1989). The past two decades has witnessed a resurgence 
of U.S. interest and support of the ILO. Id. at 71. The United States was involved at the ILO’s 
inception, but did not become an official member of the ILO until 1934. Id. at 66. The United States 
withdrew its membership in 1977 due to conflicts regarding the perceived socialist agenda of the ILO, 
failure of the ILO to address human rights violations by the Soviet Union, and the strength of the 
ILO’s tripartite structure. Id. at 68–69. However, the United States rejoined in 1980. Id. at 66. See also 
Edward C. Lorenz, The Search for Constitutional Protection of Labor Standards, 1924–1941: From 
Interstate Compacts to International Treaties, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569, 569 (2000). “American 
involvement in the ILO began as an effort to overcome Supreme Court opposition to national labor 
standards. With domestic judicial opposition to standards gone after World War II, American’s 
remarkable early leadership diminished when domestic attacks on the ILO undermined American 
defense of universal labor rights.” Lorenz, supra. 
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conventions.83 The failure of countries to ratify many of these conventions 
signals that the principles and rights embodied within them have not 
become global norms. 
By not including labor standards in trade agreements, U.S. trade policy 
implicitly assumes that multinational corporations, suppliers, and workers 
will establish global labor norms through relational contracting. In this 
sense, U.S. trade policies utilize unrestricted private ordering as a primary 
vehicle for eliminating sweatshops. Multinational corporations have the 
potential to impact the labor conditions in developing countries. However, 
as discussed below, unequal bargaining power and economic disparities 
between nations pose significant barriers to spontaneous private ordering.  
Those opposed to linking labor standards and trade sanctions argue that 
free trade will promote wealth maximization and a corresponding 
improvement in global labor standards. Free trade has acted as a catalyst 
for rapid economic growth,84 but whether free trade has achieved its 
purported objectives is more questionable.  
Economic globalization accounts for a significant portion of the United 
States’ economic growth. Within the past decade, the liberalization of 
trade has increased the United States’ gross domestic product by nearly 
40%.85 Exported goods and services accounted for 10.4% of the United 
States’ GDP in 2005 and for 20% of overall growth in the U.S. economy.86  
Despite economic growth, the failure of U.S. trade policy to address 
global labor standards has raised questions about whether U.S. companies 
have fully realized the benefits of increased economic integration and 
whether improved labor standards will materialize without governmental 
intervention. A key component of U.S. economic policy is to open foreign 
markets to U.S. products and services.87 The philosophy of U.S. trade 
 
 
 83. The U.S. history of ratification was “the worst record of any major industrial nation.” 
Srinivasan, supra note 67, at 228 (quoting Steve Charnovitz, Promoting Higher Labor Standards, 
WASH. Q., Summer 1995, at 167, 178). Charnovitz explains the United States’ reluctance to ratify the 
conventions. “First, because U.S. treaties are the ‘supreme law of the land,’ ratifying an ILO 
convention could supersede federal and state labor laws if provisions of the convention can be 
enforced in domestic courts. Second, many Americans are reluctant to have U.S. policy reviewed by 
an international organization.” Id.  
 84. DAVIDSON & MATUSZ, supra note 23, at 17. “One of the most widely accepted propositions 
in economic analysis is that, for each nation participating in international commerce, the aggregate 
gains from trade almost surely exceeds the aggregate costs.” Id. 
 85. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trade Delivers Growth, Jobs, 
Prosperity, and Security at Home (July 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document 
_Library/Fact_Sheets/2006/asset_upload_file451_9646.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). 
 86. Id. 
 87. For a description of President George W. Bush’s international trade policy, see http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/infocus/internationaltrade/. 
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policy centers on removing trade barriers to allow U.S. businesses to reach 
the world’s potential customers for U.S. products, 95% of whom live 
outside the United States.88 
To achieve this goal, the United States has entered into bilateral, 
regional, and global trade agreements with several countries. For example, 
U.S. agreements with Peru eliminated trade barriers and opened a market 
of 28 million consumers to U.S. companies.89 In 2005, the exports of U.S. 
goods to Peru reached $2.3 billion.90 Assistant U.S. Trade Representative 
Everett Eissenstat testified before Congress: “[A]ccording to the 
International Trade Commission, our industrial and agricultural exports to 
Peru are expected to increase annually by as much as $1.1 billion once the 
[trade agreement] is fully implemented.”91  
Despite the growth in U.S. exports, the U.S. trade deficit persists and 
continues to grow. For example, in Vietnam, two-way trade grew from $1 
billion in 2000 to $7.8 billion in 2006.92 Deputy U.S. Trade Representative 
Karan Bhatia reports: “[O]ver that same period, U.S. exports to Vietnam 
increased 150% to $1.2 billion, making Vietnam among the fastest 
growing Asian markets for U.S. goods.”93 Although two-way trade grew 
overall, Vietnamese imports outnumbered American exports by a ratio of 
approximately six to one. 
The rapid economic growth resulting from U.S. free trade policies has 
not been without a price. Globalization has been criticized, perhaps 
unfairly, as being “the product of a concerted effort of a number of 
powerful actors on the global scene to ensure not only that globalization 
continues as a process, but that it does so to their advantage.”94 As one 
critic noted, “‘[T]he result of general free trade would not be a universal 
republic, but, on the contrary, a universal subjection of the less advanced 
nations to the supremacy of the predominant manufacturing, commercial, 
and naval power . . . .’ Globalism is thus the product of unilateral 
parochialism.”95 
 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Everett Eissenstat, Assistant U.S. Trade Rep.). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Authorizing the Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Normal Trade Relations 
Treatment) to the Products of Vietnam: Hearing on S. 3485 Before the S. Finance Comm., 109th Cong. 
(2006) (statement of Karan K. Bhatia, Deputy of U.S. Trade Rep.). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Rex Honey, An Introduction to the Symposium: Interrogating the Globalization Project, 12 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2002). 
 95. Eisuke Suzuki, The Fallacy of Globalism and the Protection of National Economies, 26 
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The concerns raised by critics of globalization are not without 
foundation. When the ILO promulgated the 1998 Declaration, it 
recognized that economic growth alone would not effectively address 
international concerns regarding labor conditions in developing 
countries.96  
Public policy concerns regarding child labor arose as early as the 
Industrial Revolution.97 The impact of globalization on exploitive child 
labor practices has been pronounced.98 It is not unusual to hear of thirteen-
year-olds working thirteen-hour days making handbags while getting paid 
$24 per month, or working eighty-hour weeks to make sweaters while 
getting paid only pennies per hour.99  
Further, despite optimistic forecasts that economic growth would 
maximize global wealth, evidence suggests that unrestricted private 
ordering, free trade without labor standards, has had a negative impact on 
economic disparities between nations.100 The International Labour 
Organization reported that, in 1960, the GDP per capita of the twenty 
richest nations was eighteen times higher than the GDP of the twenty 
 
 
YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 321–22 (2001) (quoting FRIEDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 112 (Samson S. Lloyd trans., Angustus M. Kelley 1966) (1841)).  
 96. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work—About Me Declaration, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.INDEXPAGE. 
 97. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 6, at 1. 
 98. Dexter Samida, Protecting the Innocent or Protecting Special Interests? Child Labor, 
Globalization and the WTO, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 411, 411–21 (2005) (considering the link 
between international trade and child labor). See also Saida Toor, Child Labor in Pakistan: Coming of 
Age in the New World Order, 575 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 194, 203–04 (2001); 
Christopher M. Kern, Child Labor: The International Law and Corporate Impact, 27 SYRACUSE J. 
INT’L L. & COM. 177 (2000) (discussing the negative impact of child labor and the need for 
international law to restrain child labor abuses); Christopher L. Erickson & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, 
Labor Standards & Trade Agreements, U.S. Experience, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 145 (1998). 
 99. See Timothy A. Glut, Changing the Approach to Ending Child Labor: An International 
Solution to an International Problem, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1203, 1203 (1995) (arguing that a 
connection exists between the acute increase in child labor and globalization). 
 100. The ILO explained the need for global labor standards.  
By the beginning of the 1990s, it was clear that the world had changed. Globalization, the 
information technology revolution, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of a universal 
market economy for the first time since 1914 provided the impetus for a global debate on core 
labour standards—both within and beyond the International Labour Organization. 
Debate intensified as it became apparent that economic growth alone was not enough. When 
the processes commonly called globalization first emerged, it was widely assumed that 
internationalization, technological change, the market economy and democratization would 
provide the essential ingredients for growth, employment and well being. This proved not to 
be the case everywhere. 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work—Background, http://www.ilo.org/ 
dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename=DECLARATIO
NBACKGROUND. 
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poorest nations.101 By 1995, it had grown to thirty-seven times higher.102 
Despite the global economic growth, the number of people living on less 
than one dollar per day remained mostly constant during the 1990s.103 
Globalization disproportionately benefits highly skilled workers over 
unskilled workers.104 Globalization’s promise of wealth maximization has 
not been realized by all workers. 
Global economic growth alone has failed to close the economic gap 
between nations. In fact, in the absence of strong global norms, rapid 
economic growth has exacerbated the disparities. As discussed below, the 
ILO’s work to eliminate child labor and forced labor suggests that 
governmental participation in articulating the relevant norms is necessary. 
Deference to privately-created norms is justified when those norms derive 
from an efficient incentive structure.105 Norms must result from open 
competition between alternatives and must not impose costs on 
nonmembers of the community.106 In developing countries, the relevant 
community consists of multinational corporations and their suppliers. 
Documentation of child labor, forced labor, and increased wealth 
disparities evidence that tremendous costs are imposed on nonmembers of 
the community, the workers in the globalized labor market. 
 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Robert C. Feenstra, Introduction to THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE ON WAGES 1 
(Robert C. Feenstra ed., 2000). In the United States, 
[t]he share of income received by the lowest quintile (20 percent) of households fell from 4.4 
percent in 1977 to 3.8 percent in 1987 to 3.6 percent in 1997, while the share of income 
received by the highest quintile of households has risen from 43.6 to 46.2 to 49.4 percent over 
the same period.  
Id. Since the early 1980s, 
the United States experienced a fall in the wages of the lowest-skilled workers, measured 
either in real terms or relative to wages of high-skilled workers; a fall in the relative 
employment of less-skilled workers; and, as a result of both of these, an increase in the share 
of total labor income going to high-skilled workers.  
Id. at 1–2. 
 105. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to 
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1694–96 (1996). 
 106. Id. 
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C. The ILO’s Core Labor Standards: Coordinating Implementation of 
Labor Norms 
The ILO’s approach to global labor standards offers an opportunity to 
examine the process for creating and enforcing norms through a non-
dichotomized approach. The literature on private ordering and social 
norms usually characterizes norms as either private or public. Scant 
attention is given to norms developed through a cooperative process 
involving both government and private actors. The ILO utilizes a 
cooperative process whereby governments, employers, and workers 
participate in the formation of global labor norms.  
The ILO accomplishes its mission through three main bodies, each of 
which encompasses the ILO’s tripartite structure. Workers and employers 
participate as equal partners with governments in the work of the ILO’s 
governing body.107 The tripartite structure encourages consultation and 
collaboration between private industry and sovereign governments in 
resolving global labor problems. As a result, the norms that emanate from 
the ILO are not perfectly categorized as either public or private norms.  
The member states of the ILO, as sovereign nations, are not obliged to 
ratify the conventions. To the extent that there is meaningful participation 
by worker and employer representatives, the norms, if ratified, become 
public norms created by public and non-government actors.  
The idea for the ILO originated with Robert Owen and Daniel Legrand, 
two industrialists who were concerned about the impact of 
industrialization on workers.108 Owen observed: 
In the manufacturing districts it is common for parents to send their 
children of both sexes at seven or eight years of age, in winter as 
well as summer, at six o’clock in the morning, sometimes of course 
in the dark, and occasionally amidst frost and snow, to enter the 
manufactories, which are often heated to a high temperature, and 
contain an atmosphere far from being the most favourable to human 
life, and in which all those employed in them very frequently 
continue until twelve o’clock at noon, when an hour is allowed for 
 
 
 107. The ILO’s governing body consists of fifty-six individuals: twenty-eight government 
representatives, fourteen employer representatives, and fourteen worker representatives. ILO CONST. 
art. 7, § 1, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm.  
 108. ILO, About the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/ history.htm. 
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dinner, after which they return to remain, in a majority of cases, till 
eight o’clock at night.109 
Owen’s views on reducing work hours and child labor were 
incorporated into the ILO’s Constitution.110 The Preamble to the ILO 
Constitution recognizes that “an improvement of [working] conditions is 
urgently required; as for example, by the regulation of the hours of work 
including the establishment of a maximum working day and the week 
. . . the protection of children, young persons and women . . . .”111 
Despite the ILO’s historical mission to promote labor standards, the 
ILO had limited success in garnishing support for global labor standards 
prior to 1998. In an effort to build consensus around labor rights, the ILO 
reduced the more than 180 conventions and 190 recommendations to four 
primary principles. The ILO identified “core labor standards”—pertaining 
to forced labor,112 freedom to associate,113 freedom to organize and 
bargain collectively,114 equal pay,115 discrimination,116 minimum age,117 
and child labor118—in its 1998 Declaration. The 1998 Declaration 
proceeds on the assumption that “maintain[ing] the link between social 
progress and economic growth” requires a guarantee of fundamental labor 
 
 
 109. ROBERT OWEN, OBSERVATIONS OF THE EFFECT OF THE MANUFACTURING SYSTEM (1815). 
 110. About the ILO, supra note 108. 
 111. ILO CONST. pmbl., available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2007).  
 112. ILO Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, supra note 70; ILO Convention 
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, supra note 70. These conventions require the suppression 
of forced or compulsory labor, with limited exceptions for military service and emergencies. 
 113. ILO Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize, supra note 75. This convention establishes the rights of all workers and employers to form 
and join organizations of their own choosing without prior authorization and lays down a series of 
guarantees for the free functioning of organizations without interference by the public authorities. 
 114. ILO Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to 
Bargain Collectively, Convention No. 98, adopted July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.C. 258. This convention 
provides for protection against anti-union discrimination.  
 115. ILO Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of 
Equal Value, supra note 77 (calling for equal pay and benefits for men and women for work of equal 
value). 
 116. ILO Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, 
Convention No. 111, adopted June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 32 (calling for a national policy to 
eliminate discrimination in access to employment, training and working conditions, on the grounds of 
race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction, or social origin). 
 117. ILO Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, June 26, 1973, 
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C138. The Convention establishes a minimum 
age that shall not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling. 
 118. ILO Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 71 (calling for immediate measures to eliminate the worst 
forms of child labor, including slave labor, forced recruitment in armed services, and the use of 
children in prostitution and pornography). 
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rights.119 The “core” labor standards represent the irreducible minimum in 
human rights protection afforded to workers worldwide. 
These global norms are the product of a concerted effort by the 
international community.120 The 1998 Declaration commits all ILO 
member states, regardless of the country’s level of development, to respect 
the core labor principles, even if such states have not ratified the specific 
conventions.121  
Following issuance of the 1998 Declaration, the ILO documented 
progress in the elimination of child and forced labor. In 2000, 
approximately 186 million children aged five to fourteen were considered 
child laborers as defined by the ILO.122 Furthermore, about 8.4 million of 
those children were victims of child trafficking, forced and bonded labor, 
armed conflict, prostitution and pornography, and other illicit activities.123 
By 2004, the number of child laborers dropped 11% globally while the 
number of children working in hazardous work decreased by 26%.124 
Despite some improvements in the problem of child labor, the ILO’s 
core labor standards appear insufficient to eliminate exploitative and 
dangerous working conditions in developing countries. Globalization has 
been linked to forced labor.125 The National Labor Committee (NLC), a 
 
 
 119. International Labor Conference, 86th Session, June 2–18, 1998, ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ¶ 5, ilolex Doc. 261998, available at http://www.ilo.org/ 
public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm [hereinafter International Labor Conference]. 
 120. Michel Hansenne, then acting ILO Director-General, stated that the ILO “had taken up the 
challenge presented to it by the international community. It has established a social minimum at the 
global level to respond to the realities of globalization . . . .” ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work—Background, supra note 100. See also Laurence R. Helfner, 
Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 649 (2006). 
 121. International Labor Conference, supra note 119, § 2. 
 122. The ILO defines “child labour” as employing children younger than fourteen years of age. 
ILO conventions adopted in 1973 permit member states to define the minimum age for their country, 
provided that the minimum age “shall not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling 
and, in any case, not less than fifteen.” ILO Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to 
Employment, supra note 117, art. II, § 3. The Convention recognizes that the minimum age may be 
lowered to fourteen years of age for members “whose economy and educational facilities are 
insufficiently developed.” Id. § 4. For statistics, see INT’L PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF 
CHILD LABOUR, INT’L LABOUR ORG., EVERY CHILD COUNTS: NEW GLOBAL ESTIMATES ON CHILD 
LABOUR 20 (2002). 
 123. INT’L PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR, supra note 122, at 25. 
 124. END OF CHILD LABOUR, supra note 97, at xi. The ILO defines “hazardous work” as “any 
activity or occupation that, by its nature or type, has or leads to adverse effects on the child’s safety, 
health (physical or mental), and moral development.” Id. at 6. “Hazards could also derive from 
excessive workload, physical conditions of work, and/or work intensity in terms of the duration or 
hours of work even where the activity or occupation is known to be non-hazardous or ‘safe.’” Id. The 
list of such activities is determined on the national level. Id. 
 125. Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon—An Examination of 
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human rights advocacy group, investigates exploitive labor practices 
utilized by American companies or their suppliers producing goods in 
developing countries.126  
In March 2006, the NLC published a 168-page report documenting the 
use of sweatshops to create brand-name apparel, such as Gloria 
Vanderbilt, Liz Claiborne, Perry Ellis and Bill Blass, as well as apparel 
destined for sale in American stores, such as Wal-Mart, K-Mart, Kohl’s, 
Target, Victoria’s Secret, and J.C. Penney.127 The report documents 
numerous human rights abuses in several factories in “Qualifying 
Industrial Zones” in Jordan. According to the report, Bangladeshi workers 
at the Al Shahaed Apparel & Textile factory were stripped of their 
passports, routinely worked thirty-eight to forty-eight hour shifts, and were 
beaten and tortured.128 According to the NLC’s findings, these workers 
were paid only two cents per hour while sewing clothing for Wal-Mart and 
K-Mart.129 The Bangladeshi workers had paid “a contractor” as much as 
$3,000 to purchase three-year contracts to work in Jordan.130  
Other Jordanian factories, such as the Western factory and Al Safa, 
were accused of engaging in similar exploitive practices.131 The NLC 
report found that the Western factory, which produced clothing for Wal-
Mart, failed to pay workers who regularly worked twenty-hour shifts.132  
Similar reports of exploitation emerge from Oman, with whom the 
United States has a free trade agreement.133 The NLC has alleged that an 
 
 
Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 91, 95 (2002). Ramasastry argues that “[multinational corporations] should be held liable 
either civilly or criminally for their complicity in certain types of egregious human rights 
violations . . . .” Id. See also A. Yasmine Rassam, International Law and Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery: An Economic and Social Rights-Based Approach, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 809, 810–11 
(2005).  
Contemporary forms of slavery flourish in most states as monetary gain and expendable labor 
bring profit both to slaveholders and corrupt government officials . . . . Although international 
and domestic law universally condemns slavery and forced labor, the prevalence of so-called 
new forms of slavery calls into question the ability of existing international conventions not 
only to prevent slavery and the slave trade, but also facilitate the permanent liberation of the 
enslaved. 
Rassam, supra. 
 126. National Labor Committee Mission Statement, http://www.nlcnet.org/aboutus.php. 
 127. NAT’L LABOR COMM., U.S.-JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT DESCENDS INTO HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING & INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE 11–18 (Mar. 2006). 
 128. Id. at 3. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 5. See also Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, An Ugly Side of Free Trade: 
Sweatshops in Jordan, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at C2. 
 131. NAT’L LABOR COMM., supra note 127, at 5. 
 132. Id. at 11–18. 
 133. U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman and Oman’s Minister of Commerce signed the U.S.-
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estimated 300,000 guest workers in Oman are victims of human 
trafficking and forced labor in Omani factories that supply goods to U.S. 
companies.134 The U.S. State Department has identified Oman as a 
destination country for victims of human trafficking.135 
Dangerous working conditions exist in such factories. In February 
2006, a fire tore through a textile factory in Bangladesh. More than 1,000 
people were working in the three-story building when the fire began at 
7:20 p.m.136 The main exit to the building was illegally locked.137 The 
initial reports indicated that at least fifty-one people died; however, NLC’s 
investigation concluded that the final death toll was eighty-four.138 
According to the NLC report, the textile workers were being paid $0.10 to 
$0.14 per hour while working ten to fourteen hours per day, seven days 
per week.139  
Other NLC investigations revealed that Chinese laborers worked 15–
19.5 hours per day at the Huangwu No. 2 Factory, which manufactures 
toys for Wal-Mart and Dollar General. NLC investigators alleged: 
“Workers must complete one operation every three seconds, repeating the 
same furious motion 10,000 times a day. The constant repetition wears off 
their skin, leaving them with sore, blistered and bleeding hands and 
fingers.”140 Workers were paid between $0.43 to $3.45 per day and were 
routinely not paid for overtime.141 The workers were required to maintain 
an intense work pace that caused some to faint from exhaustion.142 During 
peak seasons, the Huangwu factory ignored national holidays and denied 
maternity leave.143 
 
 
Oman Free Trade Agreement on January 19, 2006. See Press Release, Office of the U.S Trade 
Representative, U.S. and Oman Sign Free Trade Agreement (Jan. 19, 2006). The Senate and House 
passed the U.S.-Oman FTA on June 29, 2006 and July 20, 2006, respectively. See Press Release, 
Susan C. Schwab, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on House Passage of U.S.-Oman 
Free Trade Agreement (July 20, 2006); Press Release, Susan C. Schwab, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Statement on Senate Passage of U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement (June 29, 2006). 
 134. Human Trafficking & Involuntary Servitude Under the U.S.—Jordan Free Trade Agreement: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations of the 
H. Comm. on International Relations, 109th Cong. (2006).  
 135. U.S. STATE DEP’T, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, 196–98 (2006). 
 136. 51 Die in Fire at Mill in Bangladesh, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Feb. 24, 2006, at A7. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Nat’l Labor Comm., Factory Fire in Bangladesh Kills 84 Workers Producing for American 
Companies, available at http://www.nlcnet.org/live/article.php?id=112. 
 140. Nat’l Labor Comm. & China Labor Watch, Blood & Exhaustion: Behind Bargain Toys Made 
in China for Wal-Mart and Dollar General (Dec. 21, 2005), at 1, http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/ 
upload/Huangwu.pdf. 
 141. Id. at 4–5. 
 142. Id. at 5. 
 143. Id. at 6. 
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The purpose of this Article is not to document every instance of abuse 
in sweatshops, but to demonstrate that the abuses are widespread and 
occur despite the promulgation of the ILO’s core labor standards. To some 
extent, the ILO standards end any debate as to whether universal labor 
standards extend beyond a ban on forced labor. However, the core labor 
standards are limited in their reach.144 The 1998 Declaration does not 
address other key labor concerns, such as livable wages, work hours, 
overtime pay, sick leave, maternity leave, medical benefits, and safety 
conditions. Strong communal norms on these labor issues do not exist. The 
1998 Declaration’s limited scope renders it ineffective for eliminating 
sweatshops, which may exist even in the absence of child or forced labor. 
As discussed below, private actors must overcome significant coordination 
problems to implement non-core labor standards.  
D. Private Ordering and Non-Core Labor Standards 
This Article uses the term “non-core labor standards” to describe any 
labor standard that does not fall within the scope of the ILO’s 1998 
Declaration. While the ILO’s core labor standards provide a necessary first 
step towards the elimination of sweatshops, they fail to address additional 
labor concerns, such as the need for a living wage, maternity leave, 
maximum work week, holiday leave, and occupational health and safety. 
The absence of clear global norms on these issues has left a void that 
private ordering has not filled and is incapable of filling.  
The failure of relational contracting to produce a spontaneous private 
order incorporating these standards may be explained by analogy to the 
classic prisoner’s dilemma. 
[T]wo prisoners are separately interrogated by the authorities, who 
attempt to extract confessions from each implicating the other. If 
both are silent, each will go free. If both confess, each will get a 
moderate sentence. If one confesses and the other does not, the 
former will get a light sentence and the latter a heavy sentence. 
Accordingly, both prisoners would be best off if each remains 
silent, but each fears the other will confess. To avoid the danger of 
 
 
 144. Francis Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat: The Real Potential of the 1998 ILO Declaration 
for the Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 439 (2005) (responding to Philip 
Alston’s critique of the 1998 Declaration as curtailing workers’ rights). 
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the heavy sentence (that would follow from the other’s confession), 
each confesses and incurs a moderate sentence.145 
The prisoner’s dilemma scenario demonstrates that a rational, self-
interested actor will confess because it forecloses the worst result (heavy 
sentence) and makes possible the best result (freedom).146 Thus, by acting 
rationally, both parties create a situation that is worse (a moderate 
sentence) than it would be if the prisoners had acted irrationally and 
remained silent.  
Globalization presents multinational corporations with a challenge 
analogous to the challenge presented by the prisoner’s dilemma. Non-core 
labor standards will benefit workers in both developed and developing 
countries, multinational corporations, and the governments of developing 
countries. Workers in developing countries will receive higher wages and 
safer work environments. Multinational corporations could benefit by the 
expansion of markets for goods in these developing countries. As wages 
increase, workers in developing countries are in a better position to 
purchase the products produced for the multinational corporations. 
Workers in more developed countries will benefit because improved labor 
standards globally will slow the efflux of jobs from developed countries. 
Furthermore, as U.S.-based companies find new markets, U.S. workers 
will benefit by the corresponding increase in jobs. 
U.S. multinational corporations jeopardize their competitive position if 
they act either first or unilaterally to improve labor conditions. Global 
labor standards, such as a minimum wage or medical benefits, impact the 
corporation’s production costs.147 Multinational corporations seek 
suppliers in developing countries who impose lower costs. The cost of 
these non-core labor standards depends on the country’s economic 
development. Wealthy countries can afford higher minimum wages, 
shorter working hours, and greater investment in workplace safety.148 
Multinational corporations’ focus on driving down labor costs has the 
effect of pitting one poor country against another in competition for 
corporate investment dollars.149 Some countries have been accused of 
 
 
 145.  Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 
YALE. L.J. 2039, 2058 n.84 (1993). 
 146. See generally KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHAK, ANALYZING POLITICS: 
RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 201–19 (1997) (describing the prisoner’s dilemma in 
further detail). 
 147. ELLIOTT & FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 10. 
 148. Id. at 13. 
 149. Claude Meillassoux, The Economy and Child Labour: An Overview, in THE EXPLOITED 
CHILD 47 (Bernard Schlemmer ed., 2000).  
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ignoring violations of local labor laws in order to attract foreign 
investment.150 As regulatory and labor costs increase in a particular 
country, companies may relocate their production facilities or seek 
suppliers in countries offering less costly labor to maintain their 
competitive advantage. This global competition for private investment 
hinders the economic development of poorer countries by limiting their 
ability to acquire capital.151 Thus, rational, self-interested actors will likely 
choose to remain financially competitive by seeking out cheap labor; but, 
in doing so, the corporations will worsen global working conditions and 
hinder global economic growth. 
Avery Katz’s observation that “some social norms are not valuable 
until a critical mass of people uses them” is relevant here.152 He explained, 
“[E]ven if a newly created norm would be more efficient than the status 
quo, there may be no way for a decentralized community to coordinate its 
implementation.”153 Non-core labor norms will promote a more efficient 
allocation of resources; however, the full value of global labor norms will 
not be realized unless implementation of the norms is coordinated. Just as 
the ILO created the core labor standards, the ILO could serve as a useful 
vehicle for the creation and coordination of non-core legal standards. 
 
 
Another (less often raised) practice enters the framework to weaken the so-called developing 
countries: “foreign investment.” Often presented as desirable “aid,” these investments are the 
fruit of relocation policies whose aim it is to find the least expensive labour force possible 
around the world, even it means having quickly to shift investments from one region to 
another because of local labour prices. 
Id. 
 150. Id. at 47–48. “Some countries, such as so-called ‘popular’ China, cater to this [competition 
for foreign investment dollars] by creating ‘special zones’ where particularly cheap workers are 
delivered to foreign firms, children included . . . .” Id. 
 151. Dr. Meillassoux observed: 
Foreign investments increase the dependence of the [developing] countries into which they 
are channeled by not allowing capital to be amassed in the places where the commodities are 
produced and the work is done (which is why these countries are always appealing to the 
international financial authorities for assistance) . . . . [A] country’s economic progress 
depends on its ability to accumulate, make use of and manage capital: i.e., its ability to 
constitute and reconstitute its human and material bases so that the nation can have its best 
configuration for development. Unable to keep the profits from capital, these countries are 
kept in a position of constant dependence upon foreign banks and funding agencies. 
Id. at 47–48. 
 152. Katz, supra note 13, at 1750. “Each person who decides whether to follow a norm, therefore, 
imposes a positive externality on all who use it . . . . Some norms, such as traffic laws, may become 
valuable only if they can attain the allegiance of a majority of the population.” Id. 
 153. Id.  
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E. The ILO’s Decent Work Initiative 
The ILO historically articulated its objectives in human rights terms. 
However, under its Decent Work Initiative, the ILO rephrases its objective 
as assisting developing countries realize the benefits of the economic 
growth attributable to globalization. The initiative includes social 
protections for laborers and workplace rights.154 Juan Somavia, acting ILO 
Director-General, described the Decent Work Initiative as follows: 
Decent work means productive work in which rights are protected, 
which generates an adequate income with adequate social 
protection. It also means sufficient work in the sense that all should 
have full access to income-earning opportunities. Decent work 
marks the high road to economic and social development, a road in 
which employment, income and social protection can be achieved 
without compromising workers’ rights and social standards.155 
The concept of decent work moves beyond the core labor standards 
towards broader principles of fairness. The Decent Work Initiative 
encompasses more than the human rights notion that all people should be 
free from forced labor by incorporating distributional goals. The focus of 
the decent work agenda is to guide globalization so that workers can fairly 
reap the benefits of globalization in their daily lives.  
Whereas the 1998 Declaration identified the irreducible minimum in 
labor rights, the Decent Work Initiative more ambitiously charts a path 
towards the maximization of labor rights. The ILO’s Decent Work 
Initiative is a potential source of global labor norms that include both core 
and non-core standards and, thus, can more fully address the problem of 
sweatshop conditions in developing countries. 
III. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS: EXTENDING THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
COLLABORATION 
Since the ILO issued its 1998 Declaration, it has documented a 
downward trend in child labor worldwide.156 However, insufficient wages, 
long hours, and unsafe working conditions still persist. This is due, in 
significant part, to the ILO’s lack of an efficient enforcement program. 
 
 
 154. The Director-General, Report of the Director-General: Decent Work, delivered to the 87th 
Session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva, Switz. (June 1999). 
 155. Id. 
 156. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 6.  
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Some commentators propose additional measures to implement the ILO’s 
core labor standards, ranging from private order initiatives, such as 
corporate codes of conduct and the promotion of consumer awareness, to 
public order programs, such as the inclusion of labor provisions in U.S. 
trade agreements or World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.157 
These initiatives may be characterized as international public ordering, 
national public ordering, or private ordering. 
Part III.A discusses the limitations of an international public order. The 
refusal of the WTO to address labor issues and the ILO’s weak compliance 
program create a dysfunctional international public order that should be 
supplemented by private order initiatives. While many commentators 
concede that the ILO’s enforcement program is weak, they lack unanimity 
on whether private order or national public order is needed to enforce 
global labor norms.158  
Part III.B identifies some of the inefficiencies inherent in a national 
public order from the perspective of the United States. Opportunities for 
protectionism inherent in the constitutional separation-of-powers principle 
and the high stakes nature of trade sanctions limit the efficiency of 
American public institutions in addressing global labor standards.  
Part III.C examines private order initiatives, such as corporate codes of 
conduct and consumer awareness programs, to explain how such 
initiatives may supplement the public order. While governmental 
institutions and private groups may each suffer inefficiencies, the 
inefficiencies are of distinct kinds. As the discussion below suggests, 
private order may complement public order enforcement mechanisms. 
The proposed inclusion of labor standards in global, regional, and 
bilateral trade agreements implicitly favors a “public order” enforcement 
regime. As discussed in Part II, publicly promulgated labor norms, as 
embodied in the ILO’s Decent Work concept, are necessary. However, it is 
helpful to distinguish the creation of norms from their enforcement. Public 
ordering, whether international or national, may be useful to address 
egregious failures of developing countries to enforce their local labor laws. 
 
 
 157. Thomas J. Manley & Luis Lauredo, International Labor Standards in Free Trade 
Agreements of the Americas, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 85 (2004). See also Marisa Anne Pagnatarro, 
The Helping Hand in Trade Agreements: An Analysis of and Proposal for Labor Provisions in U.S. 
Free Trade Agreements, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 845 (2004). 
 158. The U.S. State Department implicitly recognizes the need for more effective enforcement 
measures. The International Labor Affairs Office within the State Department administers a $4 million 
anti-sweatshop initiative that “fund[s] the development of and research into approaches and 
mechanisms to combat sweatshop conditions in overseas factories that produce goods for the U.S. 
market.” U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/lbr/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2007). 
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However, private ordering, working in tandem with public ordering, will 
be more efficient in identifying violations and enforcing norms against 
individual employers. 
A. The Dysfunctionality of the International Public Order 
On an international level, commentators and advocacy groups have 
focused primarily on two organizations as potential enforcers of global 
labor norms: the WTO and the ILO. The WTO has flatly refused to 
assume responsibility for global labor norms, and as discussed above, the 
ILO’s core labor standards do not extend to many of the conditions, such 
as long hours and low pay, that are associated with sweatshops.  
Furthermore, even if the WTO addressed labor standards or the ILO’s 
Decent Work agenda gained broader support among its members, such an 
international public order relies too heavily on trade sanctions against the 
governments of member states to effectively address the violations of 
individual employers. To this extent, the international public order 
proposed by linking labor standards and trade sanctions will continue to be 
dysfunctional and should be supplemented by private order. 
1. Questions of Legitimacy 
Cass Sunstein observed that some people may reject a norm because 
the source of the norm lacks legitimacy.159 This observation is particularly 
relevant to the WTO’s refusal to include labor standards in WTO 
agreements. In 1996, the First Ministerial Conference of the WTO was 
presented with a proposal to link labor standards to trade sanctions.160 The 
WTO declined to do so; instead, it opted to acknowledge the ILO’s 
authority to develop labor standards.161 The WTO’s refusal to assume 
responsibility for labor standards triggered protests and riots in Seattle, the 
host of the 1999 WTO conference.162 The WTO has since come under 
 
 
 159. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 914. 
 160. David Holley, WTO’s Small Step Forward on Worker’s Rights, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at 
D1. 
 161. World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, ¶ 4, 
WT/Min(96)/DEC/2, 36 I.L.M. 218, 221 (1997), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
minist_e/min96_e/singapore_declaration96_e.pdf. “We renew our commitment to the observance of 
internationally recognized core labour standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the 
competent body to set and deal with these standards and we affirm our support for its work in 
promoting them.” Id. 
 162. ALEXANDER COCKBURN & JEFFREY ST. CLAIR, FIVE DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD: 
SEATTLE & BEYOND (2000) (describing personal accounts of the 1999 protests in Seattle). 
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attack for protecting capital, such as intellectual property rights, but not 
the rights and safety of workers. 
The United States was a primary proponent of linking labor standards 
with trade sanctions in 1999.163 The governments of many less developed 
countries opposed the proposal on the ground that such labor standards 
were motivated by protectionism and intended to stem the flow of foreign 
investment and jobs into less developed countries.164 The industrialized 
countries that pushed for the linking of labor standards and trade sanctions 
lacked legitimacy among developing countries. Some leaders of poorer 
countries raised the concern that labor standards were designed to bolster 
workers in industrialized countries at the expense of workers in 
developing countries. 
Some advocates of linking labor standards and trade sanctions suggest 
that labor standards need not lead to protectionist abuse. For example, 
Elliott and Freeman argue that the WTO should amend its agreements “to 
include a provision allowing countries to retaliate against trade-related and 
egregious violations of the core labor standards.”165 “To minimize the 
risks of protectionism, any revision of Article XX(e) should focus on 
egregious and narrowly defined violations of standards—based on ILO 
supervisory evidence, and subject to WTO review, just as actions under 
Article XX currently are.”166 Elliott and Freeman’s proposal seeks to 
achieve legitimacy by narrowing the categories of sanctionable conduct 
and elevating the standard by which labor violations are determined. As 
formulated, the proposal would limit the WTO’s effectiveness in 
addressing “non-egregious” violations. 
Even if an international organization, such as the WTO, were to impose 
trade sanctions for violations of ILO labor standards, the dysfunctionality 
of the system would still require private ordering to supplement the 
international public order. The ILO’s difficulty in using trade sanctions to 
coerce compliance with labor standards demonstrates this point. 
 
 
 163. Steven Greenhouse & Joseph Kahn, U.S. Effort to Add Labor Standards to Agenda Fails: 
Trade Group Stalls Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at A1. 
 164. See Christopher L. Erickson & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, The American Experience with Labor 
Standards & Trade Agreements, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 41, 42–43 (1999). See also Juli 
Stensland, Internationalizing the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 4 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 141, 149 (1995). 
 165. ELLIOTT & FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 89. 
 166. Id. (emphasis added). 
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2.  Trade Sanctions: An All-or-Nothing Approach 
Trade sanctions, by their nature, are harsh penalties that should be used 
sparingly to avoid concerns that a country is engaging in protectionism. 
The ILO has limited tools to encourage compliance with ILO’s labor 
standards.167 Its compliance program relies heavily on technical support 
and services. The ILO monitors compliance with ILO conventions by 
requiring member countries to submit periodic reports to the ILO 
concerning the progress they are making toward compliance.168 The ILO 
also makes “direct requests” for information to countries with a history of 
noncompliance.169 The ILO gathers and disseminates information on 
compliance and non-compliance with the conventions. The ILO primarily 
uses shame and reputational incentives to encourage compliance. 
The limited effectiveness of the ILO’s compliance program is 
exemplified by the enforcement challenges presented by the widespread 
use of forced labor in Myanmar.170 The ILO’s “softer managerial 
approaches and shaming strategies” were ineffective against Myanmar’s 
military government.171 Although the ILO’s Constitution permits the ILO 
to pursue “such actions as it may deem wise and expedient to secure 
compliance,”172 the ILO was reluctant to impose trade sanctions.173 In 
2000, the ILO issued a resolution asking its member states to consider 
trade sanctions against Myanmar.174 The ILO’s compliance resolution 
prompted Myanmar to consider some labor reforms.175 However, this 
cooperation was short lived. Labor rights violations in Myanmar increased 
between 2003 and 2005, and Myanmar has threatened to withdraw from 
the ILO.176 
 
 
 167. Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization 
and the Innovations of the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 711 (2006). “The goal of the ratification 
campaign and the Declaration was to create, on paper at least, a common core of legal standards 
applicable to the entire ILO membership. Promoting compliance with these commitments presented a 
far more difficult task.” Id. 
 168. Schlossberg, supra note 82, at 51. 
 169. Id. at 51–52. 
 170. Helfer, supra note 167, at 711–13. 
 171. Id. at 711–12. 
 172. ILO CONST. art. 33, 62 Stat. 3485, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/ 
english/about/iloconst.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). 
 173. Helfer, supra note 167, at 712. “In practice . . . trade sanctions remained politically and 
legally out of bounds since the ILO’s founding.” Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 712–13. 
 176. Id. at 713. 
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The Myanmar situation demonstrates the difficulty with utilizing 
governmental trade sanctions as an enforcement mechanism. Such an 
approach, which has limited impact on states, has even less direct impact 
on non-governmental suppliers. Trade sanctions are tailored to address the 
failures of governments to take effective measures to protect labor rights. 
Trade sanctions may be warranted if the government actively participates 
in the labor rights violations or if the government fails to take any actions 
to address rampant violations by private actors. However, trade sanctions 
may be viewed as heavy-handed if states are making a good faith, but 
ineffective, attempt to address labor rights.177 
Trade sanctions, at best, indirectly pressure sweatshop operators to 
improve working conditions by shaming governments into adopting laws 
more protective of labor rights. Furthermore, it is conceivable, as the 
Myanmar situation demonstrates, that a country threatened with sanctions 
might not respond by raising labor standards, but instead choose to forego 
the benefits of international trade. The threat of trade sanctions may 
potentially result in economic isolation, which could be even more 
harmful to the workers whom the norms are designed to protect. 
B. Dysfunctionality of National Public Order: The United States’ 
Perspective 
Another formulation of the public order is to include “labor provisions” 
in U.S. bilateral or regional trade agreements; thus, creating a national 
public order. A national public order suffers from some of the same 
legitimacy issues as an international public order. Aggressive unilateral 
U.S. action may be perceived as protectionism. Furthermore, from the 
U.S. perspective, the doctrine of separation of powers, inter-branch 
political struggles, and U.S. interdependence with the global economy 
create inefficiencies in the national public order. The linking of labor 
standards and trade sanctions in U.S. trade agreements is an important 
step; however, as discussed more fully below, the nature of U.S. foreign 
policy interests and U.S. public institutions will limit the effectiveness of 
trade sanctions as an enforcement vehicle for labor standards. 
 
 
 177. For example, the ILO’s recent report on child labor stated that the struggle to end child labor 
in Africa is complicated by the number of children orphaned by the AIDS epidemic. INT’L LABOUR 
OFFICE, supra note 6, at 60–65. 
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1. Separation of Powers, Protectionism, and Influence on Trade 
Policies 
The inclusion of labor provisions in trade agreements raises the initial 
question of which branch of government has the authority to impose trade 
sanctions. The U.S. Constitution does not expressly designate which 
branch of government has the power to terminate trade agreements. The 
Constitution’s silence as to the process for terminating treaties178 and even 
whether a free trade agreement is a treaty179 has generated substantial 
commentary.180 The “separation of powers” principle, evident in the 
Constitution, awards Congress a prominent, although not well-defined, 
position in modern day foreign affairs. 
The U.S. Constitution does not designate a preeminent policymaker in 
foreign affairs. The separation of powers principle, which is woven 
throughout the U.S. Constitution, is evident in the constitutional allocation 
of foreign affairs powers. Specific powers affecting foreign affairs are 
allocated to both the executive and legislative branches. The Constitution 
designates the President as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces181 
and empowers the President to make treaties,182 appoint ambassadors183 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and receive ambassadors and 
other public ministers.184 The Constitution also imposes broad powers on 
the legislative branch: the power to impose tariffs and duties,185 the power 
to regulate foreign commerce,186 the power of the Senate to advice and 
consent in the treaty process,187 the power to declare war,188 the power 
 
 
 178. See, e.g., Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 179. See, e.g., Made in the USA Foundation v. U.S., 242 F.3d 1300, 1311–20 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(considering whether NAFTA is a treaty requiring two-thirds approval of the Senate). 
 180. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 265 (2001) (arguing that the Executive Power includes authority to 
terminate treaties unilaterally). Compare Raoul Berger, The President’s Unilateral Termination of the 
Taiwan Treaty, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 577 (1980); Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and 
President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties—The Original Intent of the Framers of the 
Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
 181. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 182. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 183. Id. 
 184. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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over naturalization,189 and the power to organize and fund military forces 
for the nation.190 As Edward Corwin observed: 
What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer upon 
the president certain powers capable of affecting our foreign 
relations, and certain other powers of the same general nature upon 
the Senate, and still other powers upon Congress; but which of these 
organs shall have the decisive and final voice in determining the 
course of the American nation is left for events to resolve.191 
Corwin characterized the Constitution’s silence on this point as “an 
invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign 
policy.”192 
In recent decades, the roles of the President, Senate, and Congress in 
foreign affairs, while never perfectly defined, have become even more 
intertwined as the use of economic sanctions rather than military force has 
gained prominence as a foreign policy tool. The risks associated with 
nuclear war made military force less attractive as a means of protecting 
U.S. interests.193  
Commentators have questioned the extent of the President’s power to 
use economic sanctions as a diplomatic tool to the exclusion of the Senate 
or Congress.194 For example, the Bush administration’s trade policies blur 
the line between foreign trade and national security.195 Rob Portman, U.S. 
Trade Representative, clarifies this point in his statement upon the signing 
of the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement: “The promotion of peaceful 
commerce with the [Middle East] region and among Middle East states 
 
 
 189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 191. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984 201 (N.Y. Univ. 
Press 1984) (emphasis added). 
 192. Id.  
 193. Justin D. Stalls, Economic Sanctions, 11 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 116 (2003) 
(discussing the expanded use of economic sanctions as a tool for diplomacy). See also GARY C. 
HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (1985) (examining the use of economic 
sanctions to achieve a broad range of policy goals, such as U.N. sanctions against the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan in 1999). 
 194. Lawrence M. Reich, Foreign Policy and Foreign Commerce?: WTO Accessions and the U.S. 
Separation of Powers, 86 GEO. L.J. 751, 753 (1998) (discussing the separation of powers issue in the 
context of foreign affairs). 
 195. See George W. Bush, President of the United States, Remarks on Signing Bill to Strengthen 
Trade Between the United States and Ukraine (Mar. 23, 2006) (transcript available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060323-1.htm). 
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will help end the political turmoil and economic stagnation that has for too 
long limited the opportunities for people in that region.”196  
The lack of clarity regarding the constitutional allocation of treaty 
power subjects decisions regarding trade sanctions to the political interests 
of individual states. The decisions of the President and members of 
Congress are influenced by a desire to get reelected.197 The inclination of 
modern presidents toward trade liberalization are due, in part, to their 
representation of national interests.198 Presidents emphasize the overall 
health of the U.S. economy.199 Members of Congress, on the other hand, 
“are sensitive to particular industry groups who are affected economically 
in a favorable or unfavorable manner by changes in international trading 
conditions and who can significantly influence the election prospects of a 
member of Congress by bloc-voting and the funding of political ads.”200 
An example of congresspersons’ susceptibility to local protectionist 
interests is a bill introduced to repeal permanent normal trade relations 
with China.201 When introducing the bill in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Vermont Representative Bernard Sanders argued that his 
state lost twenty percent of its manufacturing jobs to China between 2002 
and 2006.202 He argued that “[t]rade is a good thing, but it must be based 
on principles that are fair to American workers. The U.S. Congress can no 
 
 
 196. Rob Portman, U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks on Signing Implementing Legislation to 
the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (Jan. 11, 2006).  
 197. Robert E. Baldwin, U.S. Trade Policies: The Role of the Executive Branch, in CONSTITUENT 
INTERESTS AND U.S. TRADE POLICIES 65 (Alan V. Deardorrf & Robert M. Stein eds., 1998). “In the 
simplest economic models, elected public officials, the suppliers of particular trade policies, are 
motivated by a desire to be returned to office (or gain public office, if not already elected) and, 
consequently, are responsive to the lobbying demands on the various pressure groups.” Id. 
 198. Id. at 69. “Representing a much broader constituency than individual members of Congress, 
Presidents give greater weight in their trade policy decisions to the general standard-of-living benefits 
of trade liberalization . . . and less weight to the concerns of particular industry groups.” Id. See 
generally DELIA B. CONTI, RECONCILING FREE TRADE, FAIR TRADE, AND INTERDEPENDENCE—THE 
RHETORIC OF PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP (1998), for a detailed discussion of presidential 
trade policy. 
 199. CONTI, supra note 198, at 150. President Bill Clinton stated: 
This increasing international interdependence is seen by some as a threat to our nation and 
our values as Americans—but the truth is almost precisely the reverse. It is American values 
and principles—freedom, determination, market economies—that are ascendant around the 
globe. It is American companies that are gaining most from rapid growth in international 
trade. It is American products made by American workers that are in highest demand as the 
standards of living improve in countries around the world. 
Id. (quoting BILL CLINTON, BETWEEN HOPE AND HISTORY 176 (1997)). 
 200. Baldwin, supra note 197, at 69. 
 201. S. 2267, 109th Cong. (2006). See also H.R. 728, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 202. We Must Repeal PNTR with China, 151 CONG. REC. H497 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Sanders). 
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longer allow corporate America to sell out the middle class and move our 
economy abroad.”203 Similar arguments were made by Senator Byron 
Dorgan when he introduced a related bill in the U.S. Senate.204 These 
arguments suggest the bill is motivated more by a desire to protect 
American workers than by an interest to improve working conditions 
globally. 
Although congresspersons may have higher susceptibility to 
protectionist pressure, the President is not immune.205 Protectionist 
pressure on the President was evidenced by the United States’ pressure on 
Mexico not to sell their tomatoes in the United States (with which Mexico 
had a free trade agreement) at a price lower than 20.68 cents per pound.206 
A senior official in the Clinton administration stated: “This was Mexico’s 
moment to pay back for the bailout”—referring to the United States’ 
decision to lend Mexico $12.5 billion following the peso crisis of 
December 1994.207 Another official explained, “The math was pretty 
simple, Florida had 25 electoral votes, and Mexico doesn’t.”208 President 
Clinton’s decision to pressure Mexico on tomato prices was clearly 
connected to the President’s susceptibility to protectionist pressures.  
The separation of powers principle embodied in the U.S. Constitution 
introduces opportunities for protectionist backlash into the policymaking 
process. The struggle between the executive and legislative branches for 
the control over economic sanctions is particularly important to states 
negatively impacted by globalization. As U.S. businesses relocate their 
manufacturing facilities or choose suppliers in developing countries over 
suppliers in the United States, jobs will shift out of the state more quickly 
 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Trade Deficit, 152 CONG. REC. S1064 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2006) (statement of Sen. Dorgan).  
Increasingly, companies are moving their jobs from the United States to China, to India, to 
Bangladesh, to Indonesia. So the jobs that remain are jobs that have a downward pressure on 
wages, more and more pressure to get rid of retirement programs, more pressure to strip 
health care benefits. In my judgment, that is going to head this country toward serious 
trouble. 
Id. 
 205. See CONTI, supra note 198, at 134. President Clinton “pursued a largely private campaign” to 
pass NAFTA. Id.  
[T]he administration was not sure it wanted to aggressively fight for passage of the 
legislation. Once again, the Democratic presidential dilemma of fighting for free trade while 
minimizing opposition from traditional Democratic constituencies was a delicate balancing 
act. Clinton was especially reluctant to publicly support NAFTA because of the vocal 
opposition of labor.  
Id. at 134.  
 206. Srinivasan, supra note 67, at 248 n.1. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/2
p 205 Burkeen book pages.doc10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] PRIVATE ORDERING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 243 
 
 
 
 
than new jobs are created.209 This movement of jobs may trigger a 
protectionist backlash against globalization.210 Congresspersons, in efforts 
to protect their constituents, have introduced legislation protecting 
commerce within their states.  
According to traditional presidential rhetoric, free trade would help 
U.S. workers by opening markets for goods exported by U.S. companies. 
However, a trade gap exists, in part, because the workers in developing 
countries are not being paid sufficient wages to purchase U.S.-produced 
products.211 Because markets in developing countries are sluggish, U.S. 
jobs are not being created as quickly as jobs are being lost, and the wages 
of unskilled workers in the United States are depressed.212  
Some congresspersons have responded by introducing legislation to 
protect the U.S. economy.213 For example, Senators Byron Dorgan and 
Russ Feingold introduced legislation214 that “would create a market-based 
system to cut the trade deficit to zero within 10 years.”215 The bill 
authorizes the issuance of certificates to U.S. companies that export 
goods.216 The exporter can use the certificate, which authorizes the 
importation of goods, or sell it to another company—thus, creating a 
market for the certificates. This certificate program would impose an 
 
 
 209. DAVIDSON & MATUSZ, supra note 23, at 1–2.  
[T]he picture that emerges is one of a world in which workers, particularly those near the 
bottom of the income distribution, cycle between periods of employment and unemployment. 
Changes in the degree to which the economy is open to trade are bound to affect the transition 
rates between these states.  
Id. 
 210. See Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of State and Local 
“Sanctions” Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States’ Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs?, 
26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307 (1999) (discussing Massachusetts law barring state contracts with 
companies that do business with Myanmar). 
 211. Import Certificates Proposed to Shrink Trade Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at C5 
[hereinafter Import Certificates]. “The United States trade gap reached a record $717 billion in 2005 
and is on track to exceed $800 billion this year. About a quarter of the deficit is with China alone.” Id.  
 212. See, e.g., Kletzer, supra note 21, at 351.  
To date, there is an emerging consensus, both theoretical and empirical, that U.S.-developing 
country trade lowers the employment and wages of U.S. lower-skilled workers . . . . [S]kill 
differences between the manufacturing and nontraded sectors . . . will release relatively 
unskilled workers into the nontraded (service) sector, leading to a fall in the relative wage of 
unskilled workers.  
Id. 
 213. See, e.g., S. 872, 109th Cong. (2005) (a bill to amend the tax code to provide for the taxation 
of income of foreign corporations controlled by U.S. entities, when such income is attributable to 
imported property). See also S. 196, 109th Cong. (2005). The legislation was designed to close a tax 
loophole that rewards U.S. companies that move U.S. manufacturing jobs overseas.  
 214. Balanced Trade Restoration Act of 2006, S. 3899, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 215. Import Certificates, supra note 211.  
 216. Id.  
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overall cap on imported goods by limiting imports to the number of issues 
certificates—i.e., the monetary value of exports.217  
The problem with protectionism is its failure to address the working 
conditions of millions of people living in developing counties. Until labor 
conditions in China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and other countries improve, 
corporations will continue to have an incentive to outsource to suppliers in 
these countries.  
A more strategic approach is to establish labor standards. Such an 
approach will have the dual effect of addressing the number of human 
rights concerns for workers in developing countries and of addressing job 
opportunities for U.S. citizens. When workers in developing countries earn 
more money and have improved working conditions, they will be able to 
afford U.S.-made products. 
2. Trade Sanctions: High–Stakes Diplomacy 
In an increasingly globalized economy, trade sanctions have become a 
high-stakes form of diplomacy. The threat of trade sanctions can have 
severe repercussions not only on the sanctioned country, but also on the 
United States. The United States has limited ability to terminate or 
suspend trade agreements without jeopardizing its own access to foreign 
markets. American trade policies are targeted towards opening foreign 
markets to U.S. goods. Another country’s conduct that would trigger 
unilateral trade sanctions by the United States would need to be 
sufficiently severe and pervasive to warrant the United States to cut off 
trade relations with the other country.  
The United States’ ambivalence towards using trade sanctions to 
address violations of labor standards is evident in the language of the trade 
agreements, as well as the United States’ record of rarely resorting to trade 
sanctions. The labor provisions in U.S. trade agreements are designed to 
address only wholesale governmental failures to enforce local labor laws. 
For example, the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement provides that “[a] 
party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained 
or recurring course of action or inaction . . . .”218 The “sustained or 
recurring course of action” language suggests that only complete failure to 
take any action towards enforcing labor laws will result in a violation of 
 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on 
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan,  art. 6, para. 4(a), Oct. 24, 2000 [hereinafter U.S.-
Jordan Free Trade Agreement]. 
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the trade agreement. The labor clause does not require the other country to 
dedicate resources towards enforcement or investigation: “[E]ach party 
retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, 
prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other 
labor matters determined to have higher priorities.”219  
Further evidence of the United States’ reluctance to use trade sanctions 
aggressively is the rarity with which the United States has terminated trade 
agreements based on labor standards violations. The United States 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program provides duty-free 
access to U.S. markets for specified imports from eligible countries, 
subject to certain conditions, including the requirement that the country 
protects or is taking steps to protect the internationally recognized rights of 
workers.220  
The legislation authorizing the GSP program was amended to 
incorporate reference to the ILO’s core labor standards.221 Recent U.S. 
bilateral trade agreements have included a “labor” clause.222 A typical 
example is as follows: 
The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the 
International Labour Organization (“ILO”) and their commitments 
under the [1998 Declaration]. The Parties shall strive to ensure that 
such labor principles and the internationally recognized labor rights 
set forth in [the trade agreement] are recognized and protected by 
domestic law.223 
The labor provision requires each country to recognize the core labor 
standards articulated in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration.224  
 
 
 219. Id. art. 6, para. 4(b). 
 220. ELLIOTT & FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 75 (citing Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor 
Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
199–238 (2001)). 
 221. Prior to this amendment, the United States defined workers’ rights differently from the ILO 
core labor standards. Id. The United States’ list excluded the right to nondiscrimination in the 
workplace but included “acceptable conditions of work, including minimum wages, hours of work, 
and occupational health and safety.” Id. 
 222. U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 218; Agreement Between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of 
a Free Trade Area art. 15, U.S.-Bahrain, Sept. 14, 2004; Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 
6, 2003; Agreement Between the United States of America and Peru on the Establishment of a Free 
Trade Area, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006. 
 223. See, e.g., U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 218, art. 6, para. 1. 
 224. Id. 
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The United States’ GSP program provides for the review of complaints 
by industry groups and human rights groups that certain countries have 
violated the labor clause. 
Overall, only 13 countries out of the 47 reviewed by any U.S. 
administration have had their GSP eligibility terminated or 
suspended. Benefits were restored in 5 of these cases. Most of the 
cases—Burma, Chile, Liberia, Nicaragua, Romania, Sudan and 
Syria—also involved foreign policy interests far beyond workers’ 
rights . . . .225  
According to Elliott and Freeman, the countries that have lost GSP 
benefits due to labor rights violations tended to be smaller and poorer 
countries.226  
The United States’ unwillingness to use trade sanctions against larger, 
more powerful countries, such as China, to address labor violations 
suggests that a national public order alone will not eliminate sweatshop 
conditions globally. “Coercive trade sanctions, or the threat thereof, will 
change the behavior of a foreign government when that government 
perceives that the costs of the sanctions will be greater than the perceived 
costs of complying with the sanctioner’s demands.”227 The GSP program 
is reasonably effective with respect to poorer countries because they 
“perceive that defying U.S. demands will have higher costs than 
complying with them.”228 However, the result of the cost-benefit analysis 
differs substantially for a country, such as China, where the United States 
benefits from access to Chinese markets as much as China benefits from 
access to U.S. markets.229 
The efficiency of a national public order, from the U.S. perspective, is 
at its highest when the subject of the sanctions is a country that lacks 
economic and political significance to the United States. A national public 
order’s efficiency is significantly weakened when the target of the 
proposed sanctions is a country of greater economic or political 
significance. 
 
 
 225. ELLIOTT & FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 84.  
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at 78. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Srinivasan, supra note 67, at 226. “The fact that political and trade relations with China are 
far more consequential to U.S. foreign policy and business interests than those with Myanmar certainly 
played a role in the differing U.S. stance in the two cases.” Id. 
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C. Private Order 
Private ordering schemes have taken the form of consumer awareness 
programs and corporate codes of conduct. John McMillan and Christopher 
Woodruff argue that private ordering arises in countries without adequate 
legal systems.230 Within the globalized labor market, the legal structures 
are inadequately developed to create an effective international or national 
public order. As discussed above, even if the United States incorporates 
“labor clauses” in its free trade agreements with other nations, the United 
States’ enforcement mechanism is not as efficient as it would be if 
supplemented by private ordering.  
1. Corporate Codes of Conduct 
Multinational firms, individually and through trade associations, are in 
a preferred position for gathering information on non-compliance with 
global labor norms and distributing such information to the community, 
consumers, and other firms in the industry. Some corporations have issued 
corporate codes of conduct to their suppliers as a means of addressing 
labor conditions.  
These corporate code programs fall within three general categories: (1) 
a mere statement of standards, (2) a statement of standards with third-party 
monitoring for compliance, and (3) a collaborative program for developing 
models for sustained code compliance. This Article argues that third-party 
monitoring and collaborative programs are essential to the legitimacy and 
efficiency of any corporate code program. 
Relational contracting is the basis for these corporate code programs. 
Corporations, either individually or collectively through industry 
associations, utilize their contractual relationship with suppliers to impose 
labor norms. These corporate codes vary widely in their substance and 
enforcement procedures.231 Some codes of conduct are co-extensive with 
the ILO labor standards; others include standards regarding compliance 
with local laws on minimum wage, health and safety standards, and 
maternity leave.232 At a minimum, corporate codes use the contractual 
relationship as a vehicle for articulating expectations regarding how 
workers should be treated. 
 
 
 230. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 33, at 2425. 
 231. See Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting International Respect for Worker Rights Through 
Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (1993) (discussing the contents of various 
corporate codes of conduct).  
 232. WAL-MART, ETHICAL SOURCING, supra note 1, at 8. 
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As a means to enforce labor norms, relational contracting offers lower 
transaction costs than public ordering in four distinct ways. First, 
multinational corporations have greater ability to monitor the conduct of 
suppliers. Public institutions have centralized information gathering. 
Furthermore, governmental agencies derive their legitimacy from 
procedural safeguards that promote fairness. However, public institutions 
function pursuant to procedural safeguards designed to limit government’s 
encroachment on personal freedom. Therefore, these institutions are 
limited in their ability to monitor factory conditions, inspect internal 
factory operations, and speak to workers.  
Multinational corporations, on the other hand, are not restricted by the 
procedural safeguards imposed on public institutions. Companies and their 
suppliers can agree to reporting requirements, scheduled compliance 
audits, and unannounced inspections.  
For example, Wal-Mart, which has enhanced its monitoring efforts, 
performed 13,600 audits of 7,200 factories in 2005.233 Wal-Mart also 
utilizes a “rating system” which determines the frequency of audits. 
Factories are rated green, yellow, orange, or red, depending on the 
findings of the audit.234 Factories with no violations or only minor 
violations are rated green and are audited annually.235 Yellow and orange 
rated factories, which have medium-risk and high-risk violations, 
respectively are audited more frequently to ensure compliance.236 Frequent 
access to the supplier’s facilities enables companies to monitor suppliers 
more effectively. 
Second, multinational corporations can consider information that might 
not be admissible in court, such as hearsay statements or impressionistic 
evidence. Multinational corporations are not restricted by evidentiary rules 
and have more flexibility in determining the relevance and reliability of 
evidence. When investigating a supplier, companies may consider 
overheard conversations, second-hand reports, and general impressions of 
managers, workers, and auditors.  
Third, multinational corporations have more flexibility in their 
decision-making process. Judicial decisions usually focus on whether 
liability exists. Court resources, or the lack thereof, are not well-suited for 
judicial monitoring of corporations, even pursuant to judicial or consent 
decrees. In response to a violation of a code of conduct, a multinational 
 
 
 233. Id. at 2. 
 234. Id. at 11. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
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corporation can determine, in light of the severity and pervasiveness of the 
violation, whether to terminate or suspend the supply relationship or to 
collaborate with the supplier to bring the supplier into compliance.  
For example, Wal-Mart reported that in 2005, 141 factories were 
permanently banned from doing business with Wal-Mart because the 
suppliers utilized child labor.237 Another twenty-three factories were 
suspended for one year for multiple instances of non-compliance.238 In 
other instances, Wal-Mart provided training to the managers of suppliers 
to prevent additional violations.239  
Finally, multinational corporations respond to violations in a more 
commercially practical time-frame than the judicial system. Judicial 
systems may take years to resolve a dispute. Companies, on the other 
hand, can respond swiftly by terminating or suspending the supply 
relationship or engage in follow-up inspections within months to ensure 
that the non-compliant behavior has been corrected. Under Wal-Mart’s 
revised program, a factory that is in violation of Wal-Mart’s code of 
conduct has 120 days to cure the violation.240 Failure to do so will result in 
a one-year suspension of the supply relationship.241 
Relational contracting provides suppliers with an incentive to allow 
multinational corporations to enter their factories. It also creates 
opportunities for collaboration. For example, McDonald’s Corporation and 
the Walt Disney Company, in conjunction with a group of faith-based 
institutional investors, implemented “Project Kaleidoscope,” a 
collaborative project to determine how factory-based compliance with 
corporate codes of conduct can be improved and sustained over time.242 
Wal-Mart’s “Stakeholder Engagement” initiative has a similar objective of 
reaching out to suppliers, non-governmental organizations, and local 
governments to improve labor practices and conditions.243 
 
 
 237. Id. at 2.  
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 8. 
 240. Id. at 11. 
 241. Id. 
 242. AS YOU SOW FOUNDATION ET AL., PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE: A COLLABORATIVE PROJECT 
TO ENCOURAGE SUSTAINED CODE COMPLIANCE, INTERIM REPORT (Jan. 2005), available at 
http://www.asyousow.org/human_rights/ProjectK.pdf. Participants include McDonald’s Corporation, 
the Walt Disney Company, As You Sow Foundation, the Center for Reflection, Education, and Action, 
Connecticut State Treasurer’s Office, Domini Social Investments LLC, General Board of Pension and 
Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, and 
Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate. Id. 
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Despite the benefits of corporate code programs, commentators have 
questioned their legitimacy.244 Some criticize the programs as attempts to 
“distract and confuse conscience-laden consumers, who have demanded 
that the goods they buy not be made or handled by exploited workers.”245 
These criticisms are due, in part, to perceived weaknesses in the 
compliance component of some code programs. Code programs that 
merely articulate “expectations” without rigorous investigation and 
compliance procedures undermine consumer confidence in these private 
programs. Corporations with weak enforcement programs receive the 
public relations benefit without internalizing the increased production 
costs associated with an effective program. Code programs should utilize 
third-party monitoring and collaborative compliance programs to address 
the concerns of legitimacy. 
In the context of promoting global labor standards, private ordering 
offers some benefits that are not available with public ordering. These 
benefits are contingent upon multinational corporations developing and 
maintaining effective compliance programs. Merely issuing corporate 
codes of conduct will not suffice. As discussed below, pressure from either 
public institutions or non-governmental institutions may motivate 
multinational corporations to develop more aggressive compliance 
programs. 
2. Public Order: A Means to Encourage Private Ordering? 
Public order can influence the private order by encouraging it, 
repressing it, or simply remaining indifferent to it.246 In the context of 
promoting global labor standards, the public order should encourage 
private ordering. According to Robert Cooter, “[t]he threat of public 
enforcement may cause people to conform to norms, fearing that private 
individuals will seek to enforce the state-supported norm. Although state 
enforcement must conform to the pre–existing social norms, ‘state 
 
 
 244. See, e.g., Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: 
The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Initiative, 30 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 111 (1998) (expressing pessimism regarding the effectiveness of corporate 
code of conduct programs). 
 245. See Owen E. Herrnstadt, Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct: What’s Missing?, 16 LAB. 
LAW. 349, 350 (2001). “These critics believe that many codes are nothing more than corporate public 
relations shams and subterfuges for avoiding real efforts to improve workers’ lives.” Id. 
 246. Ariel Porat, Enforcing Contracts in Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship 
Between Public and Private Orders, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2469 (2000). 
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enforcement of social norms can increase private cooperation and 
production.’”247  
Some recent proposals for addressing sweatshop conditions in foreign 
countries may actually suppress private ordering. For example, Senator 
Byron Dorgan and Representative Sherrod Brown introduced related bills 
in the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, to address 
the importation, exportation, and sale of sweatshop goods in the United 
States.248 Representative Brown from Ohio argued: 
[I]n [many Ohio communities, one knows] that the Federal 
Government’s trade policies are undermining American 
manufacturers. . . . [One] knows that our trade policies are 
encouraging the spread of abusive sweatshop practices.  
China is the world’s sweatshop leader, with repressive labor 
policies resulting in wage suppression of as much as 85 percent. We 
all know that American workers can compete in a global economy 
on a level playing field, but no one can compete with prison labor, 
child labor or sweatshop labor . . . . In my State alone, in Ohio, 
42,000 jobs have been lost to China since the year 2001.249 
In the Decent Working Conditions and Fair Competition Act 
(DWCFC), the term “sweatshop good” is defined as “any good, ware, 
article, or merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly in or in 
part in violation of core labor standards.”250 The DWCFC attempts to hold 
corporations legally accountable to the core labor standards articulated in 
ILO’s 1998 Declaration.251  
The DWCFC contemplates two enforcement mechanisms: (1) 
enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and (2) a private 
right of action. The FTC must investigate any workers’ allegations that the 
Act was violated.252 The proposed legislation includes a private right of 
action, whereby competitors or investors of the retailer have a right to sue 
 
 
 247. Macey, supra note 35, at 1133–34. 
 248. Decent Working Conditions and Fair Competition Act, S. 3485, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 249. Support the Decent Working Conditions and Fair Competition Act, 109 CONG. REC. H4497 
(daily ed. June 22, 2006) (statement of Rep. Brown). 
 250. Decent Working Conditions and Fair Competition Act, S. 3485, 109th Cong. § 307(a)(2) 
(2006). 
 251. The DWCFC defines the “core labor standards” as consisting of the right of association, the 
right to organize and bargain collectively, a prohibition on the use of forced and compulsory labor, a 
minimum age for the employment of children and requires acceptable conditions of work with respect 
to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational health and safety. See id. §3(a). The right to a 
nondiscriminatory workplace is not included.  
 252. Id. § 201(c). 
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for damages.253 Competitors or investors are entitled to “$10,000 per 
violation or the fair market value of the goods, whichever is greater . . .”254 
and may sue for injunctive relief,255 and, if prevailing, recover the cost of 
the suit.256  
The stiff penalties essentially impose costs on sweatshop goods to force 
the companies to internalize the costs associated with cheap labor. The 
impact of the DWCFC, if enacted, would dissuade private corporations 
from maintaining relationships with overseas suppliers once evidence of 
any violations come to their attention. Multinational corporations will be 
dissuaded from collaborating with certain suppliers in order to sustain 
compliance with global labor standards. To this extent, the proposed 
DWCFC will repress private ordering. 
3. Consumer Awareness Programs 
Some commentators contend that consumer awareness programs could 
impose pressure on multinational corporations to require their suppliers to 
comply with higher labor standards.257 Consumer activism may be 
motivated by altruism or purely selfish concerns.258 To the extent 
consumers care about the workplace conditions in which goods are 
produced, consumer awareness could impose pressure on multinational 
corporations to improve labor standards.259 For instance, United Students 
Against Sweatshops (USAS), a non-profit organization, promotes 
awareness by advocating for preferred supplier programs and product 
labeling.260 
A consumer awareness program depends on the willingness of 
consumers “to pay higher prices for goods demonstrably made under 
better working conditions.”261 Concerned consumers may opt not to 
purchase products from a company that utilizes sweatshop labor.262 Their 
 
 
 253. Id. § 202(a), (c). 
 254. Id. § 202(d)(1). 
 255. Id. § 202(d)(2). 
 256. Id. § 202(d)(3) “The court shall award the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s 
fee, to a prevailing plaintiff.” Id. 
 257. See, e.g., Liubicic, supra note 244. 
 258. Srivinasan, supra note 67, at 230. Consumers motivated by protectionist concerns may fear a 
“race to the bottom” for labor standards. For such consumers, “low labor standards anywhere 
threatened the sustainability of ‘high’ labor standards everywhere.” Id. 
 259. ELLIOTT & FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 10. 
 260. For a detailed description of USAS’s work, see LIZA FEATHERSTONE & UNITED STUDENTS 
AGAINST SWEATSHOPS, STUDENTS AGAINST SWEATSHOPS (Verso 2002). 
 261. ELLIOTT & FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 10. 
 262. See Sonia Gioseffi, Corporate Accountability: Achieving Internal Self-Governance Through 
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refusal to purchase such products could send a message to multinational 
corporations that they should work to improve labor conditions or risk 
losing the U.S. market. If the company chooses to retain the market by 
observing higher labor standards, the costs of the imported goods are 
likely to increase.263 Under this approach, consumers and the exporting 
country share the cost of improving labor standards.264 
U.S. consumerism potentially undermines the effectiveness of the 
consumer-based approach. Inexpensive goods enable U.S. consumers to 
sustain a quality of life comparatively higher than others in the world. 
Donald L. Kohn, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, noted the 
connection between increased economic interdependence and low-
inflation in the United States: 
In the world in which we live, it seems natural to expect, as others 
have argued, that the greater integration of product and financial 
markets would have exerted some downward pressure on inflation. I 
cannot look back at the experience in the United States over the past 
decade without discerning the imprint of such forces.265 
U.S. consumerism sends a mixed signal to multinational corporations 
about the use of private ordering to improve labor conditions. Americans 
are accustomed to purchasing cheap goods, whether it is a dozen socks for 
three dollars or the “free” toy in a fast food child’s meal. U.S. consumers 
consume at disproportionately higher rates than consumers in less 
developed countries.  
Consumer awareness programs are dependent, in part, upon U.S. 
consumers’ willingness to pay more for what they consume. However, a 
more compelling explanation for the effectiveness of consumer awareness 
 
 
Sustainability Reports, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 510 (2004) (describing a study finding 
that 76% of consumers were willing to pay higher prices to purchase goods not made in a sweatshop). 
 263. Srinivasan, supra note 67, at 231–32. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Donald L. Kohn, Vice-Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the European Economics 
and Financial Centre Seminar, House of Commons, London, England (July 6, 2006) (transcript 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2006/20060706/default.htm).  
Nevertheless, the existing research does highlight several channels through which 
globalization might have helped to hold down domestic inflation in recent years. These 
channels include the direct and indirect effects on domestic inflation of lower imported prices, 
a heightened sensitivity of domestic inflation to foreign demand conditions and perhaps less 
sensitivity to domestic demand conditions, downward pressure on domestic wage growth, and 
upward pressure on domestic productivity growth. 
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programs is the fear among U.S. corporations of a protectionist backlash. 
Corporations may adopt or strengthen their corporate code programs as 
they sense a groundswell of support for protectionist measures.266  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Globalization has proceeded at record speed. As corporations have 
moved jobs out of the United States in favor of cheaper labor in 
developing countries, U.S. workers and advocacy groups have raised 
concerns about protecting the U.S. economy and the human rights of 
workers abroad.  
Multinational corporations have the potential to use their contracting 
powers to improve the labor conditions of workers. Recent literature on 
private ordering and norms provides a theoretical framework within which 
to analyze these issues. In the context of globalization, corporations are 
not likely to develop rigorous labor standards that could impact the 
existence of sweatshops. An organization, such as the ILO, could be 
instrumental in coordinating the creation of standards. However, the ILO 
lacks an effective enforcement mechanism.  
Private ordering among multinational corporations can fill the gaps in 
international and national public orders. However, companies must be 
pressured to adopt aggressive monitoring and compliance programs.  
International and national public order systems that impose pressure 
through trade sanctions on developing countries will have limited impact 
on sweatshop conditions. Trade sanctions, as a diplomatic last resort, may 
target the most egregious human rights violations. Consumers may 
provide indirect pressure on multinational corporations to the extent they 
represent the threat of protectionist backlash.  
As multinational corporations sense a groundswell of support for 
protectionism, the corporations may attempt to act first before the public 
institutions respond by imposing trade barriers. 
 
 
 266. Herrnstadt, supra note 245, at 349. “For many of these corporations, references to bettering 
the lives of workers is prompted by the market demand of conscience-laden consumers. As 
competition becomes more fierce, these corporations calculate that they must pacify perceived public 
demands regarding the treatment of workers.” Id. 
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